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Children negatively evaluate those who fail to conform to group norms (e.g., doctors who 
harm people, boys who wear lipstick; Kalish, 2012), yet to what extent do groups per se evoke a 
prescriptive stance? This was unaddressed in previous research, which provided additional cues 
that may have encouraged a prescriptive stance (e.g., moral principles, membership in one of the 
groups, or cultural input regarding non-conformity). In this dissertation, I tested whether children 
interpreted innocuous behaviors of novel groups (harmless characteristics shared by individuals 
within an unfamiliar group) as prescriptive (characteristics that individuals should do). Children 
ages 4-13 and adults were introduced to two novel groups: Hibbles and Glerks, who engaged in 
innocuous behaviors (i.e., the kind of music they listened to, berries they ate, games they played, 
and language they spoke). They were then shown conforming and non-conforming individuals 
and were assessed on the extent to which they approved or disapproved of their actions 
(measured though evaluations, negativity ratings, and open-ended explanations).
In Chapter II, I report three studies finding that children disapproved of non-conformity 
and justified their disapproval through norm-based reasoning (e.g., “Hibbles are not supposed to 
do that”; Study 1). These effects replicated across competitive and cooperative intergroup 
contexts (Study 2) and stemmed from reasoning about group norms rather than norms applied to 
individuals (Study 3). In Chapter III, to more precisely understand what information children 
used to detect group norms, a new group of children was randomly distributed across four 
conditions that manipulated how group norms were presented: group labels, generic statements, 
visual groups, or control. Children disapproved of non-conformity in all but the control 
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condition. Because U.S. society tends to value independence over interdependence (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), U.S. children may come to perceive non-conformity as an expression of 
individuality, and thus evaluate it less negatively than children from societies that tend to value 
interdependence. I tested this in Chapter IV by assessing children and adults recruited in Jianshi, 
China (population ~ 500,000). Paralleling U.S. children, Jianshi children disapproved of non-
conformity and their rates of disapproval declined with age. In contrast to U.S. children, 
however, they remained relatively more disapproving at an older age. 
Collectively, these findings demonstrate that children used group norms to generate 
prescriptive judgments, and that this tendency emerged 1) when reasoning about innocuous 
behaviors in novel groups, 2) with only minimal perceptual and linguistic input, and 3) across 
cultures, though variable in the rate at which it declined across development. I will discuss the 
implications for how readily children engage in group-based norm enforcement and stereotyping, 
as well as the theoretical and practical significance of the present findings, and will detail 






Social groups consist of a collection of individuals believed to share certain properties. 
For example, physicians are expected to heal people, boys are expected to not wear lipstick, and 
Ph.D. students are expected to write dissertations (Devine, 1989; Kalish, 2012). Importantly, 
social groups are often believed to consist of individuals who should share certain properties: 
Physicians who don't help others, boys who wear lipstick, or Ph.D. students who do not work on 
their dissertations may be evaluated negatively (Blakemore, 2003; Heilman, 2012; Levy, Taylor, 
& Gelman, 1995). Thus, once children (and adults) believe that a social group is characterized by 
a property (i.e., descriptive group regularity), they tend to believe that individual group members 
should be characterized by that property (i.e., prescriptive group norm). This “descriptive-to-
prescriptive tendency” is at the heart of the current work. To what extent do children use 
descriptive group regularities to generate prescriptive judgments?  
Previous research in developmental, cognitive, and social psychology documents that 
factors that contribute to children's negative evaluation of non-conformity include familiarity 
with groups (e.g., gendered language and segregation tell children about how boys and girls 
should be; Bigler & Liben, 2006), in-group biases (e.g., children believe that in-group members 
who violate group norms are threatening to the group’s cohesion and functioning; Rutland, Hitti, 
Mulvey, Abrams, & Killen, 2015), moral concerns (e.g., it is unacceptable to harm other; 
Smetana, 1981), and coalitional concepts (e.g., children often believe that when social groups are 
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in competition, individual group members should conform to their own group; Rhodes, 2012). 
The primary goal of my dissertation work is to examine whether children interpret regularities 
that are purely descriptive as prescriptive, in the absence of these factors, thereby revealing a 
more intuitive mechanism through which children enforce group norms and stereotypes.  
I predicted that children’s disapproval of group norm non-conformity would be rooted in 
their reasoning about norms. That is, preschool-aged children are quick to recognize, adopt, 
create, and enforce norms across several social domains (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). For 
example, they protest when someone violates the rules of a newly learned game (Rakoczy, 
Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2010) and they create and teach their own rules when no 
rules are provided (Göckeritz, Schmidt, & Tomasello, 2014). When they observe a tool used in 
an unnecessary way to accomplish a goal, they use the tool in the same way and criticize those 
who do not, believing that the action reflects how the tool should be used (Kenward, 2012; 
Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). Children also interpret people’s actions as normative even in the 
absence of pedagogy or normative language (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011), and even 
after seeing an action occur only once (Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016). With this 
research in mind, I predict that children interpret social groups as normative, thereby taking 
descriptive group regularities and using them to generate prescriptive judgments.  
This research has important implications for a variety of disciplines, ranging from 
comparative biology to norm enforcement, by providing insight into the cognitive mechanisms 
that contribute to stereotyping and norm enforcement (Claidière & Whiten, 2012; Devine, 1989; 
McAuliffe & Dunham, 2016). For example, it reveals how readily children use group norms to 
evaluate and judge others, and provides insight into how readily they maintain and enforce the 
correctness of those norms.  
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The present studies 
To test the extent to which children used descriptive group regularities to make 
prescriptive judgments, I present them with two novel and third-party groups: Hibbles and 
Glerks, engaged in innocuous behaviors that contrast with one another on four dimensions (i.e., 
the kind of music they listen to, language they speak, food they eat, and games they play). 
Participants are then introduced to conforming and non-conforming individuals (e.g., a Hibble 
who listens to music more typical of Glerks). I measure participants’ disapproval of the 
behaviors, degree of negativity toward the behaviors they disapprove of, and open-ended 
explanations justifying their evaluations. I take a developmental approach, as this method 
permits identifying early-emerging, foundational processes that underlie the more complex 
representations held by adults (Gelman, 2003; Olson & Dweck, 2008; Rhodes, 2012; Wellman, 
2014). I focus on children from 4-13 years of age, because during this period there are important 
changes in children's school-based and peer-based experiences and their social reasoning (e.g., 
with regard to categorization, identity, and stereotyping), and as a comparison to related work 
also focused on this age period (Bigler & Liben, 1997; Quintana, 1998; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; 
Roberts & Gelman, 2015). Adults provide an important comparison group to assess mature 
patterns of reasoning. Including preschool-aged children is especially useful, as they have fewer 
social experiences than their older peers. Thus, including a wide range of age groups is useful for 
testing the extent to which children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency is early emerging and 
intuitive, or developed with age and experience.  
In Chapter II, I report data on the strength of children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive 
tendency, as well as the extent to which it declined with age. I also report data on whether this 
tendency replicates across intergroup contexts (i.e., whether the novel group is shown to be in 
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competition or in cooperation), and whether it is reduced by focusing children on individuals 
rather than groups. These data are published in Cognitive Science (Roberts, Gelman, & Ho, 
2017a). In Chapter III, I report data on how visual and linguistic cues contribute to this tendency. 
These data are published in the Journal of Experimental Child Psychology (Roberts, Ho, & 
Gelman, 2017b). The data reported in Chapter IV address whether children’s descriptive-to-
prescriptive tendency replicates internationally. These data are published in the Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology (Roberts, Guo, Ho, & Gelman, 2017c). Taken together, the 
research presented here provides strong empirical support for an early emerging descriptive-to-
prescriptive tendency that emerges 1) when reasoning about innocuous behaviors of novel 







So it is, so it shall be: Group regularities license children’s prescriptive judgments 
Abstract 
The research reported in this chapter examined children’s (4-13 years) and adults’ use of 
group regularities to make prescriptive judgments, employing novel groups (Hibbles and Glerks) 
that engaged in morally neutral behaviors (e.g., eating different kinds of berries). Participants 
were introduced to conforming or non-conforming individuals (e.g., a Hibble who ate berries 
more typical of a Glerk). Children negatively evaluated non-conformity, with negative 
evaluations declining with age (Study 1). These effects were replicable across competitive and 
cooperative intergroup contexts (Study 2), and stemmed from reasoning about group regularities 
rather than reasoning about individual regularities (Study 3). These data provide new insights 
into children’s group concepts, have important implications for understanding the development 
of stereotyping and norm enforcement, and lay the foundation for the subsequent studies.   
Introduction 
Adults and young children alike make use of group concepts to infer regularities 
regarding familiar categories such as gender and race, as well as novel groups to which they 
themselves do not belong (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010; 
Liben, Bigler, & Krogh, 2002; Roberts & Gelman, 2015; Shutts, Pemberton Roben, & Spelke, 
2013). They also often treat regularities as prescriptive, at least under certain conditions. By 4 
years of age, children disapprove of individuals who violate moral precepts or gender norms, and 
they treat individuals who follow descriptive regularities as more representative group members 
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than those who do not (Blakemore, 2003; Cooley & Killen, 2015; Kalish, 2012; Levy et al., 
1995; Rhodes & Chalik, 2013). By adulthood, the tendency to go from the descriptive to the 
prescriptive can have severe social consequences. For instance, the belief that women are 
collaborative and deferential, whereas men are independent and assertive, can lead to negativity 
toward individuals who violate those beliefs (e.g., a woman who prefers independence over 
collaboration), which ultimately, can produce workplace bias and prevent career advancement 
(for a review, see Heilman, 2012). 
These studies yield important insights into prescriptive reasoning, yet in each case 
participants had access to cues beyond group membership per se that may have encouraged a 
prescriptive stance. Some studies focused on familiar groups and properties for which there is 
cultural input regarding non-conformity (e.g., Blakemore, 2003; Levy et al., 1995). For instance, 
from an early age, young children are taught that gender reflects real and meaningful differences 
(e.g., via gender segregated spaces and occupations), and they may even encounter punishment 
or ridicule from peers or adults when they attempt to transgress gender boundaries (e.g., Liben, 
Bigler, & Krogh, 2001). Other studies involved participants' own group membership and may 
have therefore been influenced by in-group positivity (e.g., Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams, & 
Killen, 2014). For instance, by 6 years of age, children perceive non-conforming in-group 
members more negatively than non-conforming out-group members, because the former threaten 
in-group cohesion and loyalty (Rutland et al., 2015). Others studies included morally laden 
behaviors (e.g., harming others) that have inherent meaning to children as well as adults (e.g., 
Mulvey, 2016; Smetana, Conry-Murry, & Sturge-Apple, 2012), or they primed inter-group 
competition which may have heightened attention toward groups (e.g., Rhodes, 2012). Thus, an 
important open question is the extent to which prescriptive judgments persist even without these 
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extra cues--for example, when people are asked to reason about unfamiliar groups to which they 
do not belong, and regarding morally neutral behaviors in noncompetitive contexts. 
Research on “over-imitation” suggests an early-emerging tendency to treat descriptive 
rules as prescriptive norms, even under the minimal conditions outlined above (see Nielsen & 
Haun, 2016). After 2-year-old children observed a behavior paired with a goal (e.g., twiddling an 
object before using it to open a box), they followed the behavior rigidly and expected others to 
do the same, even when they understood that the behavior itself was irrelevant for achieving the 
goal. When children saw someone omit the irrelevant behavior before achieving the goal, they 
protested using prescriptive language (e.g., saying that the individual should follow the behavior 
and that it is wrong to do otherwise), and similarly, children who observed someone violate the 
rules of a newly learned game responded with a prescriptive critique (Kenward, 2012; Rakoczy 
& Schmidt, 2013). Taken together, these findings suggest that children take a prescriptive 
interpretation of regularities that guides what they believe individuals should do.  
Of course, prescriptive judgments regarding imitation or games need not extend to 
prescriptive judgments toward social groups. Yet children may similarly treat group regularities 
as prescriptive and thus negatively evaluate non-conforming individuals. An evolutionary, 
functional account of “norm psychology”—arguing that adherence to norms and punishment of 
non-conformity facilitates cultural learning and group coordination—supports this possibility 
(e.g., Chudek & Henrich, 2011), as does the tendency for humans (and non-human animals) to 
engage in group conformity (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Claidière & Whiten, 2012; Haun & 
Tomasello, 2011; Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014). Alternatively, individuals may initially treat 
social groups as entailing strictly descriptive regularities, and in the absence of experiences with 
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the group, membership in the group, or morally laden behaviors, they may not interpret those 
regularities as prescriptive.  
We examined how people used information about the way a group is (i.e., descriptive 
regularities) to make inferences about the way individuals should be (i.e., prescriptive 
judgments), under conditions with novel groups, morally neutral and harmless behaviors, and an 
absence of in-group membership or competition cues. Exploring this question is important, as a 
link between descriptive regularities and prescriptive judgments under such “minimal 
conditions” may reveal how readily adapted humans are to engage in norm enforcement and 
conformity-based reasoning. That is, once we acquire the belief that group concepts are 
diagnostic of individual characteristics (i.e., stereotypes) we may have a cognitive basis from 
which to negatively evaluate non-conforming individuals. 
In the present research, we introduced participants to two novel groups, Hibbles and 
Glerks, who were described in terms of morally neutral regularities (e.g., the kinds of berries 
they eat). Participants were then introduced to conforming or non-conforming individuals. We 
measured participants' disapproval or approval of the behavior, degree of negativity toward 
behaviors they disapproved of, and open-ended explanations regarding how they justified their 
evaluations. This research differs from previous research in three important ways. First, we did 
not ask about familiar groups or behaviors about which participants have prior expectations (e.g., 
wearing gendered clothing). Second, we did not ask about behaviors with moral underpinnings 
(e.g., harming others). Third, participants were not members of either of the groups.  
STUDY 1 
Study 1 focused on children's and adults' evaluations of conforming and non-conforming 
individuals. We focused on children from 4-13 years of age, because important changes are 
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taking place over this period in children's experiences in school settings and peer group 
interactions, as well as in their social categorization, identity, essentialism, and stereotypes (e.g., 
they become more sophisticated in social categorization and attuned to the importance of social 
categories) and because this is a common age range in this kind of research; Bigler and Liben, 
1997; Quintana, 1998; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Roberts & Gelman, 2015, 2017a). Adults 
provide an important comparison group to assess mature patterns of reasoning. 
Method 
Participants 
 Four age groups of participants were included (N = 106): twenty-four 4- to 6-year-olds 
(39% female, M age = 5.37 years, SD = .80), thirty-one 7- to 9-year-olds (52% female, M age = 
8.52 years, SD = .90), twenty-seven 10- to 13-year-olds (33% female, M age = 11.39 years, SD = 
.97), and twenty-four adults (46% female, M age = 20.87, SD = 1.65). Children were recruited in 
the Midwest at two university-affiliated museums. Adults were recruited on a college campus. 
The sample was mostly white/European American (67% white/European American, 13% Asian 
American/Asian/Pacific Islander, 6% Hispanic/Latino, 6% Multiracial, 4% black/African 
American, and 4% other or not reported).1  
Materials and procedure 
 All materials were presented on a laptop using PowerPoint. First, participants were 
introduced to cartoon drawings depicting members of two novel groups: Hibbles and Glerks, and 
were told, “I’m going to tell you about two kinds of groups. This group (pointing) is called 
Hibbles, and this group (pointing) is called Glerks.” Each group consisted of three individuals 
located on one side of the screen (left or right), and group membership was portrayed by clothing 
                                                          
1As with prior developmental research with comparable designs (e.g., Rhodes & Chalik, 2013; Roberts & Gelman, 
2015), we sought to have at least 24 participants within each age group and condition (across all studies). Data 
collection was stopped the day this goal was achieved.  
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pattern (green stripes, orange triangles) and group labels (Hibbles, Glerks). Following the 
introduction of the novel groups, participants received eight test trials; for each, they heard a 
property of each group and were then introduced to a conforming or non-conforming individual. 
Across the eight trials, there were four behavioral domains: Food ("Hibbles eat these kinds of 
berries [pointing] and Glerks eat these kinds of berries [pointing]. Look [revealing the target], 
this Glerk is eating these kinds of berries [pointing]"), Games ("Hibbles play games with this 
kind of toy [pointing] and Glerks play games with this kind of toy [pointing]. Look [revealing 
the target], this Glerk is playing games with this kind of toy [pointing]"), Language ("Hibbles 
speak this kind of language [pointing] and Glerks speak this kind of language [pointing]. Look 
[revealing the target], this Glerk is speaking this kind of language [pointing]"), and Music 
("Hibbles listen to this kind of music [pointing] and Glerks listen to this kind of music [pointing]. 
Look [revealing the target], this Glerk is listening to this kind of music").  
Each behavior was depicted by a character that matched its respective group in color 
(e.g., orange clothing pattern corresponded with orange berries, an orange boomerang-shaped 
toy, orange words in a foreign script within a speech bubble, and an orange musical note). 
Across participants, we counterbalanced which pattern depicted which group, which pattern was 
associated with which group label, and the left-right order in which the groups were presented. 
The eight test trials were presented in random order. Half of the trials depicted a non-conforming 
individual and the other half depicted a conforming individual (for Figure 1 for an example trial). 
Measures and coding 
 Across all studies, all independent variables and manipulations are reported. The first 
measure was the frequency with which participants evaluated behaviors as “okay” or “not okay” 
(evaluation, e.g., “Is it okay or not okay for this Glerk to eat these kinds of berries?”). We 
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calculated the frequency with which these evaluations occurred for both conformity and non-
conformity trials (potential range for each was 0 to 4). Because the frequencies of “okay” and 
“not okay” evaluations were precise inverses, we focused on “not okay” evaluations as the first 
dependent variable, which reflected disapproval toward a given behavior. The second measure 
was the negativity with which participants rated “not okay” behaviors. That is, participants who 
evaluated a behavior as “not okay” were presented a scale with three increasingly unhappy faces 
and asked, “Is it a little bad, pretty bad, or very, very bad?” (1 = a little bad, 2 = pretty bad, 3 = 
very, very bad).  
 The third measure was derived from the explanations that participants provided for their 
evaluation (i.e., approval or disapproval), which were recorded verbatim. Given the open-ended 
nature of these responses, participants generated a wide range of explanations. Using previous 
research as a theoretical guide (Rhodes, 2014; Rutland et al., 2015), explanations were coded 
into five types: (a) norm-based (e.g., “They are supposed to”; “They are not allowed to”), (b) 
group-based (e.g., “That’s what Glerks do”; “They are the same kind”), (c) individual-based 
(e.g., “He wants to”; “Different people like different things”), (d) similarity-based (e.g., “They 
are orange”; “They look different”), and (e) other (e.g., “It has a weird face”). Participants could 
appeal to multiple explanations within a single response, as codes were not mutually exclusive. 
Two independent coders who were blind to the hypotheses of the study conducted the coding 
(Cohen’s kappa = .76) with disagreements resolved by discussion. We then calculated the 
percentages of times that each type of explanation was provided (out of the total number of 
trials) for each response type. Importantly, each type of explanation’s valence could have been 
positive or negative. For instance, for group-based or similarity-based explanations, they could 
have referred to shared group membership (e.g., “because they are a Hibble”) or different group 
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membership (e.g., “because they are not a Glerk”). Nevertheless, we used these broad codes 
because in each case participants referred to the same mechanism (e.g., the group, individuality, 
norms, similarity). For a similar coding scheme, see Rhodes (2014). See Table 1 for the coding 
scheme.  
Results 
 There were no effects of the counterbalancing factors across any of the studies. Also, 
preliminary analyses revealed that all effects were robust across behavioral domains (i.e., food, 
games, language, music; for analyses by domain see Appendix A. Accordingly, data were 
collapsed across these variables. All reported effects were followed by Bonferroni-corrected 
pairwise comparisons.  
Disapproval toward conformity and non-conformity 
 We conducted a 4 (age group: 4-6, 7-9, 10-13, adult) x 2 (behavior: conformity, non-
conformity) repeated measures ANOVA with age group as a between-subjects variable, behavior 
as the within-subjects variable, and the frequency of not-okay evaluations as the dependent 
variable. Higher scores indicated a greater frequency of evaluating behaviors as “not okay”, and 
therefore, greater disapproval (scores could range from 0 to 4). There were significant main 
effects of age group, F(3, 102) = 22.12, p < .001, ηp
2 = .40, and behavior, F(1, 102) = 82.24, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .45, and a significant interaction of age group and behavior, F(3, 102) = 6.10, p = 
.001, ηp
2 = .15. All child groups, but not adults (p = .44), were significantly more disapproving of 
non-conformity than of conformity (ps < .001), and all child groups were more disapproving of 
non-conformity than adults (ps < .001). Also, 4- to 6-year-olds were more disapproving of 
conformity than all other age groups (who did not differ significantly from one another). These 
data are presented graphically in Figure 2. 
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 We next conducted a series of one-sample t-tests to compare disapproval rates against 
chance (i.e., 2). For conformity, disapproval was below chance in all age groups: 4 to 6: M = 
1.13, SE = .16, t(23) = -2.73, p = .012, d = .56, 7 to 9: M = .07, SE = .14, t(30) = 30.00, p < .001, 
d = 5.38; 10 to 13: M = .04, SE = .15, t(26) = -53, p < .001, d = 10.19; Adults: M = 0. For non-
conformity, 4- to 6-year-olds were above chance, 7- to 9-year-olds and 10- to 13-year-olds were 
at chance, and adults were below chance: 4 to 6: M = 3.04, SE = .32, t(23) = 3.43, p = .002, d = 
.72, 7 to 9: M = 2.29, SE = .28, t(30) = .867, p = .393, d = .16, 10 to 13: M = 2.11, SE = .30, t(26) 
= .34, p = .74, d = .07; Adults, M = .29, SE = .32, t(23) = -9.75, p < .001, d = 1.99.  
Non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of individuals’ response patterns provided 
further insight into these data (see Table 2 for all data and statistics). Regarding conformity, all 
age groups most often approved of the behaviors. Regarding non-conformity, the youngest 
children (4 to 6) most often disapproved, older children (7 to 13) approved and disapproved at 
equal rates, and adults most often approved.   
Negativity toward non-conformity 
 Next, we focused only on those children who disapproved of non-conformity and were 
asked how bad the behavior was (1 = kind of bad, 2 = pretty bad, 3 = very, very bad; n = 64). We 
had insufficient data to include the adults (only 1 adult disapproved of non-conformity), so we 
focused only on children (twenty-one 4- to 6-year-olds, twenty-one 7- to 9-year-olds, and twenty 
10- to 13-year-olds). A univariate ANOVA with age group (3: 4-6, 7-9, 10-13) as the between-
subjects variable and negativity as the dependent variable (i.e., average across non-conformity 
trials on which they indicated “not okay”; scores could range from 1 to 3) revealed a main effect 
of age group, F(2, 59) = 9.31, p < .001, ηp
2 = .24. Four-to six-year-olds (M = 2.43, SE = .14) 
were significantly more negative than 10- to 13-year-olds (M = 1.56, SE = .14) (p < .001), and 7- 
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to 9-year-olds (M = 2.05, SE = .14) were marginally more negative than 10- to 13-year-olds (p = 
.055). Negativity did not differ significantly between the two youngest child groups (p = .18).  
Explanations 
 We next turned to the explanations that participants provided after they were asked why 
they approved or disapproved of a given behavior (e.g., “Why is it not okay for this Hibble to 
speak this kind of language?”). Explanations were given for three kinds of responses: 
Disapproved non-conformity, approved non-conformity, and approved conformity. We did not 
examine explanations when participants disapproved of conformity, as this response was so rare. 
Because not all participants provided each type of response, we did not statistically compare 
across them, but rather, examined the frequency of the four explanation types (i.e., norm-based, 
group-based, individual-based, similarity-based) within each response type (e.g., approved 
conformity). The percentages of explanation types for a given type of response were analyzed 
via a series of repeated measures ANOVAs in which age group was a between-subjects variable, 
explanation type was a within-subjects variable, and the percentage of given explanations as the 
dependent variable. All pairwise comparisons were Bonferroni-corrected, and unless noted, 
significant at the p < .05 level (for a similar analysis method, see Rhodes, 2014, Rutland et al., 
2015). Because the explanation data violated the repeated measures assumption of sphericity, we 
used the Huynh-Feldt correction to adjust the degrees of freedom for the calculated F values 
(Field, 2011; Huynh & Feldt, 1976). The explanation data are presented in Tables 3-6. 
Explanations about disapproved non-conformity 
Only 4 adults disapproved of non-conformity, so adults were excluded from this analysis. 
Focusing on children who disapproved of non-conformity (n = 61), we found a significant 
difference in explanation type, F(2.60, 150.89) = 25.08, p < .001, ηp
2 = .30, which interacted 
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significantly with age group, F(5.20, 150.89) = 7.12, p < .001, ηp
2 = .20. Importantly, 4- to 6-
year-olds gave more norm-based and similarity-based explanations than individual-based 
explanations, and 7- to 9-year-olds and 10- to 13-year-olds gave more group-based explanations 
than any other explanation type. Thus, in disapproval of non-conformity, younger children 
primarily expressed normative rules, whereas older children focused on group membership per 
se. 
Explanations about approved non-conformity 
Focusing on participants who approved of non-conformity (n = 64), we found a 
significant main effect of age group, F(3, 60) = 3.76, p = .02, ηp
2 = .16, a significant difference in 
explanation type, F(2.84, 170.45) = 10.67, p < .001, ηp
2 = .15, and a significant interaction of age 
group and explanation type, F(8.52, 170.45) = 2.17, p = .026, ηp
2 = .10. Adults and 7- to 9-year-
olds gave more individual-based explanations than any other explanation type. Thus in contrast 
to disapproval, which focused on group membership or norms, approval focused on individuals' 
wishes, desires, and choices. 
Explanations about approved conformity. Focusing on participants who approved of 
conformity (n = 102), we found a main effect of age group, F(3, 98) = 3.09, p = .034, ηp
2 = .08, a 
significant difference in explanation type, F(2.93, 287.33) = 17.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = .15, and a 
significant interaction of age group and explanation, F(5.89, 287.33) = 6.34, p < .001, ηp
2 = .16. 
The 7- to 9-year-olds and 10- to 13-year-olds gave more group-based explanations than any other 
explanation type, whereas adults gave more group-based and individual-based explanations than 






Study 1 finds that children evaluated non-conformity more negatively than conformity, 
suggesting that they viewed group-based regularities as having prescriptive force. If Hibbles 
typically eat a certain kind of food or listen to a certain kind of music, then it is not okay for a 
particular Hibble to eat a different kind of food or listen to a different kind of music – indeed, it 
is bad. Interestingly, these patterns were strongest in the youngest participants: Adults did not 
show the evaluative judgments displayed by children; and in several respects, the youngest 
children (4-6 years) were more negative than the older groups of children. One possibility is that 
the youngest children were simply more negative across the board, as they provided greater 
disapproval than the other age groups for conformity trials as well as non-conformity trials. 
However, several additional findings suggest that younger children were not simply more 
negative on the initial forced-choice question (okay/not okay), but rather, that they were 
particularly judgmental regarding non-conforming behaviors. Specifically, the youngest children 
were the only group that disapproved of non-conformity at levels that exceeded chance, and at 
the same time, disapproved of conformity at levels that were below chance. Furthermore, the 
youngest children provided stronger negativity ratings than the other groups, and in their 
individual response patterns, systematically disapproved of non-conformity (but approved of 
conformity). Finally, the youngest children explained their disapproval of non-conformity by 
expressing normative judgments (e.g., “Hibbles are not supposed to play games with that kind of 
toy”).  Altogether, these data provide converging evidence to suggest that children view group 
regularities as prescriptive, even when the groups are novel and the behaviors are innocuous.  
One methodological question concerns children’s understanding of the expression “not 
okay”, and specifically whether there are developmental changes in the semantics of this phrase 
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that could contribute to the developmental effects that were obtained. For example, if young 
children have an undifferentiated concept of norms that includes both descriptive and 
prescriptive ideas (Bear & Knobe, 2016), their disapproval for non-conformity need not be 
indicative of a prescriptive judgment as it was for older children and adults (i.e., an activity could 
be “not okay” either because it is infrequent, or because it is wrong to do). For three reasons, 
however, we believe that young children’s initial disapproval (i.e., evaluating something as not 
okay) was indeed indicative of a prescriptive judgment. First, focusing only on children who 
disapproved of non-conformity and were therefore presented with the follow-up negativity scale, 
the youngest age group showed the greatest degree of negativity, suggesting a prescriptive 
stance. Second, the youngest age group often appealed to prescriptive explanations when 
explaining their disapproval of non-conformity. Third, prior research indicates that young 
children initially treat ambiguous utterances (e.g., you can ride the bike) as deontic in meaning 
(e.g., you are allowed to ride the bike) and only later as epistemic (e.g., you are able to ride the 
bike), suggesting an early sensitivity to prescriptiveness (Modyanova et al., 2010; Papafragou, 
1997).  
STUDY 2 
Children in Study 1 may have assumed that the novel groups were competing coalitions, 
given their distinct clothing patterns and behaviors, which may have licensed inferences 
regarding norm-appropriate behaviors within and across groups (Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, & 
Ferrell, 2009; Brenick et al., 2010; Rhodes, 2012; Spielman, 2000). That is, between-group 
competition requires within-group coordination, which could increase prescriptiveness (e.g., if 
Hibbles and Glerks are working against each other, Hibbles should conform to other Hibbles), 
whereas between-group cooperation requires between-group coordination, which could decrease 
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prescriptiveness (e.g., if Hibbles and Glerks are working together, there may indeed be benefits 
for Hibbles conforming to Glerks). Consistent with this idea, recent work suggests that norm 
enforcement may be particularly likely under conditions that require within-group coordination 
(McAuliffe & Dunham, 2016). Alternatively, given the importance of norms for general group 
functioning (Chudek & Henrich, 2011), children could continue to treat group regularities as 
prescriptive, regardless of whether groups are competitive or cooperative with one another. 
Study 2 tested these alternative possibilities.  
Method 
Participants 
 Four age groups of participants were included (N = 194): fifty 4- to 6-year-olds (54% 
female, M age = 5.06 years, SD = .77), forty-eight 7- to 9-year-olds (54% female, M age = 7.94 
years, SD = .81), forty-eight 10- to 13-year-olds (47% female, M age = 11.10 years, SD = .95), 
and forty-eight adults (51% female, M age = 24.88, SD = 5.14). Children were recruited from the 
same sources as those in the first study. Adults were recruited on a college campus or via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.2 The sample was mostly white/European American (69% 
white/European American, 16% Asian American/Asian/Pacific Islander, 6% Multiracial, 4% 
black/African American, 2% Latino, and 3% other or not reported). 
Materials and procedure 
 After being introduced to the novel groups (in a procedure that was identical to that of 
Study 1), participants were randomly assigned to either a competition or a cooperation condition. 
In both conditions, the novel groups were described as building towers out of blocks (see 
Rhodes, 2012 for a similar method). In the competition condition, Hibbles and Glerks were 
                                                          
2 Research suggests that data collected in-person or via MTurk yield comparable results (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 




building towers against each other, there were not enough blocks for each group to build equally 
tall towers, and only the winning group would get a prize in the end. In the cooperation 
condition, Hibbles and Glerks were building a tall tower together, there were enough blocks for 
both groups, and both groups would get a prize in the end. To assess whether participants 
understood the competitive or cooperative context, they were asked whether there were enough 
blocks for each group. Participants who did not respond correctly were re-read the story and 
asked again (n = 17; nine at 4-6 years, seven at 7-9 years, one at 10-13 years). All participants 
completed these comprehension questions successfully. Adults recruited via Mechanical Turk 
were given an online version of the task via Qualtrics. The dependent measures were identical to 
those in Study 1. See Figures 3 and 4 for sample images and vignettes. 
Results 
Disapproval toward conformity and non-conformity 
 We conducted a 4 (age group: 4-6, 7-9, 10-13, adult) x 2 (behavior: conformity, non-
conformity) x 2 (condition: competition, cooperation) repeated measured ANOVA, with age 
group and condition as between-subjects variables, behavior as a within-subjects variable, and 
the frequency of not-okay evaluations as the dependent variable. There were main effects of age 
group, F(3, 186) = 27.20, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31, and behavior, F(1, 558) = 312.57, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.63, which were qualified by a significant interaction of age group and behavior, F(3, 186) = 
14.10, p < .001, ηp
2 = .19 (see Figure 5). All age groups were more disapproving of non-
conformity than conformity (ps < .001). For non-conformity, all child groups were more 
disapproving than adults (ps < .001), and 4- to 6-year-olds were more disapproving than 10- to 
13-year-olds (p = .005), and for conformity, 4- to 6-year-olds were more disapproving than all 
other age groups (ps < .001). There were no main effects or interactions of condition.  
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One-sample t-tests compared disapproval rates against chance (i.e., 2) across age groups, 
behavior types, and conditions. For all age groups, disapproval was below chance for conformity 
(Competition: 4-6: M = .57, SE = .10, t(27) = -7.07, p < .001, d = 1.34;  7-9: M = 0; 10-13: M = 
0; Adults: M = .05, SE = .12, t(23) = -47, p < .001, d = 9.59; Cooperation: 4-6: M = .45, SE = 
.11, t(21) = -7.95, p < .001, d = 1.69; 7-9: M = .08, SE = .11, t(24) = -34.67, p < .001, d = 6.93; 
10-13: M = .06, SE = .13, t(16) = -33, p < .001, d = 8.00; Adult: M = 0). For non-conformity, the 
youngest age groups (4-6, 7-9) disapproved at rates above chance, 10 to 13-year-olds were at 
chance, and adults were below chance (Competition: 4-6: M = 3.18, SE = .29, t(27) = 4.77, p < 
.001, d = .90;  7-9: M = 2.83, SE = .32, t(22) = 2.41, p < .025, d = .50; 10-13: M = 2.07, SE = .27, 
t(30) = -.43, p = .82, d = .08; Adults: M = 1.05, SE = .33, t(23) = -3.25, p = .004, d = .66; 
Cooperation: 4-6: M = 3.27, SE = .33, t(21) = 5.33, p < .001, d = 1.13; 7-9: M = 2.80, SE = .31, 
t(24) = 2.46, p = .022, d = .49; 10-13: M = 2.24, SE = .37, t(16) = .49, p < .63, d = .12; Adult: M 
= .70, SE = .29, t(24) = 5.02, p < .001, d = 1.00).  
Non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of individuals’ response patterns (see Table 
2) showed that regarding conformity, participants in all age groups most often approved of the 
behaviors. Regarding non-conformity, the youngest two age groups (4 to 6 and 7 to 9) most often 
disapproved, 10- to 13-year-olds approved and disapproved at equal rates, and adults most often 
approved.  
Negativity toward non-conformity 
 We again focused on participants who evaluated non-conformity as “not okay” and were 
therefore asked how bad the behavior was (n = 135; forty-six 4- to 6-year-olds, thirty-nine 7- to 
9-year-olds, thirty-one 10- to 13-year-olds, and nineteen adults). Because initial analyses 
revealed no effects of condition, we collapsed over this variable, which also provided us with 
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enough statistical power to include adults (unlike Study 1). We conducted a 4 (age group: 4-6, 7-
9, 10-13) univariate ANOVA with age group as a between-subjects variable and negativity as the 
dependent variable. There was a significant effect of age group, F(3, 131) = 8.99, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.17. Pairwise comparisons showed that all child groups were significantly more negative than 
adults (4-6: M = 2.21, SE = .10; 7-9: M = 1.92, SE = .11; 10-13: M = 1.89, SE = .12; Adults: M = 
1.26, SE = .15) (ps < .02). Child groups did not differ significantly from one another (ps > .21).  
Explanations 
 Initial analyses revealed no significant condition differences, so the data were collapsed 
across this variable. 
Explanations about disapproved non-conformity 
Focusing on participants who evaluated non-conformity as not okay (n = 112; adults were 
excluded because they rarely disapproved of non-conformity, see Table 2), we found a 
marginally significant main effect of age group, F(3, 109) = 2.96, p = .056, ηp
2 = .05, a 
significant difference in explanation type, F(2.53, 276.14) = 22.54, p < .001, ηp
2 = .17, and a non-
significant trend toward an age group x explanation type interaction, F(5.07, 276.14) = 2.04, p = 
.072, ηp
2 = .04. Four- to 6-year-olds gave more group-based, norm-based, and similarity-based 
explanations than individual-based explanations, whereas 7- to 9-year-olds and 10- to 13-year-
olds gave more group-based explanations than any other explanation type. Adults gave more 
group-based explanations than individual-based or norm-based explanations.  
Explanations about approved non-conformity 
Focusing on participants who evaluated non-conformity as okay (n = 110), we found a 
significant main effect of age group, F(3, 106) = 5.57, p = .001, ηp
2 = .14, a significant difference 
in explanation type, F(2.33, 247.12) = 55.72, p < .001, ηp
2 = .35, and a significant interaction of 
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age group and explanation, F(6.99, 247.12) = 3.72, p = .001, ηp
2 = .10. The three oldest age 
groups provided individual-based explanations more than any other explanation type.  
Explanations about approved conformity 
Focusing on participants who approved of conformity (n = 191), we found a main effect 
of age group, F(3, 187) = 4.06, p = .008, ηp
2 = .06, a significant difference in explanation type, 
F(2.58, 482.65) = 32.46, p < .001, ηp
2 = .15, and a significant interaction of age group and 
explanation, F(7.74, 482.65) = 4.19, p < .001, ηp
2 = .06. Four-to –six-year-olds gave more 
similarity-based explanations than individual-based and norm-based explanations, 7- to 9-year-
olds gave more group-based explanations than any other explanation type, and 10- to 13-year-
olds gave more group-based explanations than norm-based explanations. Adults gave more 
group-based explanations than norm-based and similarity-based explanations.  
Discussion 
 Although we used competition and cooperation manipulations that were successful in 
previous research in eliciting concepts of intergroup competition and cooperation (Rhodes, 
2012), and although all participants in the present study passed the manipulation checks, we 
obtained identical patterns in both the competition and cooperation conditions. Specifically, in 
both conditions, children evaluated non-conformity more negatively than conformity, and their 
disapproval declined with age. These data suggest that adherence to norms may be so important 
to human psychology—perhaps because of its role in cultural learning (Chudek & Henrich, 
2011)—that descriptive regularities elicit prescriptive judgments early in development and 






An alternative explanation for the results of Studies 1 and 2 is that participants’ 
judgments were not based on group regularities, but rather on any regularity, group-based or not. 
To test this, Study 3 presented individual regularities (behavioral patterns; e.g., “This one eats 
these kinds of berries”) stripped of any reference to groups. We did not provide labels because 
they are powerful cues to group membership (Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Waxman, 2010). Study 
3 included the same clothing patterns as those in Studies 1 and 2, so that non-conformity was still 
visually salient. We focused on 4- to 6-year-olds because they showed the highest rates of 
negative evaluations in Studies 1 and 2. If children’s prescriptive judgments stemmed from 
group regularities, they should not show negative evaluations when the focus is on individual 
regularities, even in the presence of visual markers of group membership.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants included twenty-five 4- to 6-year-olds (44% female, M age = 5.00 years, SD 
= .82) who were recruited from the same sources as in Study 1. This sample was mostly 
white/European American (72% white/European American, 12% multiracial, 4% black/African 
American, 12% other or not reported).  
Materials and procedure 
 The materials and procedure were identical to those in Study 1, with the exception that 
children were shown individuals instead of groups. The experimenter introduced children to two 
individuals by saying, “I’m going to tell you about these two – this one (pointing) and this one 
(pointing).” The two individuals were distinguished by clothing pattern only. After being 
introduced to the two novel individuals, participants received eight test trials that were matched 
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to those from Study 1. On each trial, participants learned about a property for each of two 
individuals, and were then introduced to a third individual who either conformed or did not 
conform to the pattern established initially. For example, “This one listens to this kind of music 
(pointing) and this one listens to this kind of music (pointing). Look (revealing the target), this 
one is listening to this kind of music (pointing).” All dependent measures (i.e., language, games, 
music, food) were identical to those in Studies 1 and 2. See Figure 6. 
Results and Discussion 
 Although our primary interest was in how children’s response patterns in a group-based 
context (Study 1) compared to an individual-based context (Study 3), we first present the data 
from Study 3 alone.  
 A paired samples t-test showed that disapproval was marginally higher for non-
conformity (M = 1.48, SE = .27) than for conformity (M = .88, SE = .20), t(24) = 1.23, p = .061, 
d = .47. One-sample t-tests showed that disapproval rates were significantly below chance (i.e., 
2) for conformity, t(24) = -5.32, p < .001, d = 1.06, and at chance for non-conformity, t(24) = -
1.80, p = .09, d = .36.  These patterns were confirmed by the Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests on the 
individual response patterns (see Table 2). Focusing only on children who disapproved of non-
conformity and were therefore asked how bad the behavior was (n = 16), children were at a mean 
level of 1.94 (SE = .16), suggesting that on average, they believed non-conformity to be “pretty 
bad”. For children who disapproved of non-conformity (n = 16), group-based explanations were 
most common, followed by similarity based-explanations, individual-based explanations, and 
norm-based explanations (see Table 6). For participants who approved of non-conformity (n = 
21), individual-based explanations were most common, followed by similarity-based 
explanations, group-based explanations, and norm-based explanations. For participants who 
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approved of conformity (n = 25), similarity-based explanations were most common, followed by 
individual-based explanations, group-based explanations, and norm-based explanations. Notably, 
norm-based explanations were relatively rare in this study (compared to Studies 1 and 2). 
Study comparison (Study 1 vs. Study 3) 
Disapproval toward conformity and non-conformity 
 We next compared the disapproval rates and negativity ratings of 4- to 6-year-olds in 
Study 1 to those in Study 3. We conducted a 2 (behavior: conformity, non-conformity) x 2 
(study: group-based, individual-based) repeated measures ANOVA with study as a between-
subjects variable, behavior as a within-subjects variable, and the frequency of not-okay 
evaluations as the dependent variable. Only effects involving study are reported. There was a 
main effect of study, F(1, 47) = 10.85, p = .002, ηp
2 = .19, and a significant interaction of 
behavior and study, F(1, 47) = 5.10, p = .029, ηp
2 = .10. For conformity, disapproval rates did not 
differ across the two studies (p = .52), whereas for non-conformity, disapproval was higher in 
Study 1 (p = .001).  
Negativity toward non-conformity 
 Next, focusing only on children who disapproved of non-conformity and were therefore 
asked how bad the behavior was (n = 37; 21 in Study 1, 16 in Study 3), we conducted a 2 (study: 
group-based, individual-based) univariate ANOVA with negativity as the dependent variable. 
The predicted significant main effect of study, F(1, 35) = 5.17, p = .03, ηp
2 = .13, showed that 
negativity was greater in Study 1 than in Study 3.  
Explanations 
 We were also interested in the extent to which children’s explanations differed across 
studies. Overall, there were no significant main or interactive effects on the basis of study. 
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However, a planned comparison confirmed the prediction that among children who disapproved 
of non-conformity (n = 38), children in Study 1 were more likely to provide norm-based 
explanations than those in Study 3, p = .047. These comparisons did not show significant 
differences for the other explanation types.  
 In summary, as predicted, when the focus was on individual regularities (Study 3) rather 
than group regularities (Study 1), children 4-6 years of age less negatively evaluated non-
conformity, suggesting that the negative evaluations displayed in Studies 1 and 2 stemmed from 
concepts of group regularities rather than regularities per se.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
A pervasive aspect of human cognition is the tendency to use what is to infer what should 
be (Hume, 2000; Kalish, 2012; Nielsen & Haun, 2016). For instance, members of a group are 
expected to behave in specific ways (e.g., Black people are expected to speak with a certain 
dialect, boys are expected to wear pants), and negative judgments befall group members who 
violate those expectations (e.g., Black people who “talk proper”, boys who wear dresses; 
Blakemore, 2003; Devine, 1989; Durkee & Williams, 2013; Levy et al., 1995). Moreover, the 
powerful ways in which regularities license prescriptive judgments emerge early in development; 
young children protest when someone fails to imitate irrelevant behaviors before achieving a 
goal, and they criticize those who fail to follow the rules of a newly learned game (Kenward, 
2012; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). The present studies systematically examined the conditions 
under which people additionally conceptualized group regularities that were novel and morally 
neutral (e.g., what kind of food Hibbles eat) as prescriptive (e.g., what kind of food Hibbles 
should eat). Studies 1 and 2 showed that children (ages 4 to 13) more often disapproved of non-
conformity than of conformity, and that disapproval rates declined with age. Compared to older 
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children (7-13), 4- to 6-year-olds were more likely to disapprove of non-conformity, rate it as 
negative, and provide norm-based explanations when justifying their disapproval. Thus, these 
studies provided converging data showing that with regard to third-party, unfamiliar, and morally 
neutral groups, the link between what is and what should be is powerful in childhood. 
The present findings have implications for research across the cognitive sciences. 
Conformity is important in a range of contexts (for example, as a learning strategy or as a means 
to gain social approval; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Corriveau, Fusaro, & Harris, 2009). Our 
results clearly demonstrate that young children negatively evaluate non-conformity even when 
there is no information to be learned and they have no personal stake in the given groups. These 
results thus suggest that an additional mechanism by which group regularities may exert 
influence is by rather automatically fostering an evaluative stance. An open question is whether 
this mechanism is found in non-human species as well as children, consistent with the proposal 
that there may be shared evolutionarily determined cognitive mechanisms that contribute to a 
cross-species preference for conformity (Claidière & Whiten, 2012). 
Critically, the observed effects were robust across different types of intergroup contexts, 
suggesting that children used group regularities to generate prescriptive judgments whether the 
novel groups were cooperating or in competition (Study 2). Of course, given the important role 
that coordination plays in intergroup cognition (McAuliffe & Dunham, 2016; Nielsen & Haun, 
2016), it is possible that more complex coordination conditions (e.g., the groups must coordinate 
in order to complete a necessary goal) or behaviors that directly relate to the coordination task 
(e.g., someone who speaks the other group’s language in order to communicate and achieve a 
necessary goal) would indeed moderate the extent to which descriptive regularities are used to 
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make prescriptive judgments. Future studies would do well to test such situations, yet, for now, 
the present data suggest that these effects need not be moderated by intergroup contexts. 
Study 3 provided an important control: When the emphasis was on individuals and not 
groups, children were less likely to disapprove of non-conformity, were less negative toward 
non-conformity, and were less likely to appeal to norm-based explanations in justifying their 
disapproval. This study was important in establishing that the effects in Studies 1 and 2 stemmed 
from group-based regularities, rather than from regularities per se. This finding also attests to 
how emphasizing individuality can shape group-based reasoning. A potential implication is that 
describing people as individuals (e.g., that person [who happens to be Black] listens to hip-hop), 
rather than in terms of their group membership (e.g., Black people listen to hip-hop), may reduce 
group-based expectations and prescriptive judgments (see also Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). An open 
question is which factors contributed to the differences between Study 3 and Studies 1 and 2. In 
Studies 1 and 2, participants were given multiple cues to group regularities: visually discernible 
groups (i.e., individuals were in sets of three and distinguished by clothing patterns that were 
shared within a group), category labels (i.e., Hibbles, Glerks), and generic statements in which 
labeled categories were linked to properties (e.g., Hibbles eat these kinds of berries). In Study 3, 
the only cue to potential cue to group regularities were clothing patterns, though note that this 
alone was not sufficient in licensing prescriptive judgments. Visual groups that are correlated 
with shared behaviors may help participants encode coalitional concepts more efficiently 
(Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003); labels imply stable, inductively rich categories (Walton & 
Banaji, 2004); and generic statements foster essentialism of groups (Gelman et al., 2010). I 
turned to these questions in Chapter 3. 
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Table 1.  











Explicitly mentions that there is a rule or an 
obligation that the individual must adhere to. 
 
“They are supposed to play with that kind of toy.” 
“They have to listen to that kind of music.” “They 
aren’t allowed to do that.” 
   
Group References the groups or the category labels. “Because that's what Glerks do.” “Because it's a 
Hibble.” “Because that’s what the rest of the group is 
doing.” 
   
Individual References mental states, including thoughts, 
emotions, motivations, traits. States that the behavior 
is about personal choice rather than group 
membership. 
“They can do whatever they want.” “They can do that 
if they like it or want to.” “Different people like 
different things.” 
   
Similarity Mentions similar or dissimilar physical appearances. “Because they are orange.” “Because it looks like that 
one.” “Green goes with green.” 
   
Other Gives an explanation that does not fit the others 
codes. 
“I don’t like them.” “It is weird.” 





Table 2.  
Non-parametric data (Chapter II, Study 1). Data are across studies, age group, and behavior, 
indicating how many participants most often approved (OK), most often disapproved (Not OK), 








































  Conformity 16 5 3 -2.39 .017 .49 
         
 7-9 Non-conformity 13 16 2 1.10 .27 .20 
  Conformity 30 0 1 -5.48 < .001 .98 
         
 10-13 Non-conformity 12 12 3 .54 .59 .10 
  Conformity 27 0 0 -5.11 < .001 .98 
         
 Adults Non-conformity 23 1 0 -4.23 < .001 .86 
  Conformity 24 0 0 -4.89 < .001 1.00 
         
2 4-6 Non-conformity 5 40 5 4.75 < .001 .67 
  Conformity 41 3 6 -5.88 < .001 .83 
         
 7-9 Non-conformity 12 32 4 3.14 .002 .45 
  Conformity 48 0 0 -4.80 < .001 .69 
         
 10-13 Non-conformity 22 25 1 .49 .62 .08 
  Conformity 48 0 0 -6.86 < .001 .99 
         
 Adults Non-conformity 38 8 2 -4.51 .001 .65 



















  Conformity 17 2 6 -3.69 .001 .74 
 
Note. The data for Study 2 are collapsed across conditions (i.e., Competition, Cooperation) as 





Explanation data (Chapter II, Study 1). Percentage of explanation types for each behavior, across 
evaluation types and age groups. 
     




































  7-9 21 19(7.2) 70.8(9) 1(3.8) 17.7(6.3) 
  10-13 19 11.9(9) 48.3(11.2) 4.2(4.7) 2.8(7.9) 

























  7-9 15 27.5(8.9) 22.9(8.6) 67.1(10.7) 5(6.5) 
  10-13 17 30.6(8.2) 20.4(8) 33(9.9) 10(6.1) 

























  7-9 31 4.7(5.2) 65.5(6.1) 17.4(5) 14.4(5.1) 
  10-13 27 11.8(5.9) 50.2(7) 16(5.6) 9.5(5.8) 
  Adult 24 9.8(5.9) 40.4(7) 34.8(5.7) 3.2(5.8) 
        
 
Note. Scores represent each type of explanation out of the total number of trials. Across studies, 
individual explanations could have been coded as of more than one type, and explanations that 
did not fit any of the coded types are not reported (this explains why the percentages can add to 
more than or less than 100). Data for disapproved conformity are not presented because this 





Table 4.  
Explanation data (Chapter II, Study 2, Competition Condition). Percentage of explanation types 
for each behavior, across evaluation types and age groups. 
     




































  7-9 17 26.3(7.3) 46.3(9.1) 4.3(3.9) 17.4(5.9) 
  10-13 20 9.8(6.5) 37.2(8) 7(3.4) 8.9(5.2) 

























  7-9 9 0 11.7(9.3) 73.8(11.4) 3.1(3.5) 
  10-13 19 7.2(3.7) 18.2(6.4) 67.2(7.7) 1.6(2.4) 

























  7-9 21 10.4(4.1) 50.3(8.1) 20.5(6.7) 23.6(6.5) 
  10-13 31 4.7(3.4) 40.8(6.7) 20.3(5.5) 25.1(5.3) 
  Adult 23 14.1(3.9) 44.9(7.7) 30.7(6.3) 8.8(6.1) 






Explanation data (Chapter II, Study 2, Cooperation Condition). Percentage of explanation types 
for each behavior, across evaluation types and age groups. 
     




































  7-9 20 14.5(6.5) 43.4(8.0) 9.4(3.4) 19.3(5.2) 
  10-13 10 13.1(9.9) 51.2(12.3) 2.4(5.3) 11.9(8.0) 


















  7-9 11 3.6(5.4) 8.9(9.4) 35.9(11.5) 3.6(3.5) 
  10-13 7 10.4(6.1) 18.7(10.6) 52.1(12.7) 7.3(4.0) 

























  7-9 25 6.1(3.7) 50.0(7.4) 10.2(6.1) 22.4(5.9) 
  10-13 17 10.2(4.7) 37.1(9.4) 21.6(7.7) 20.5(7.5) 
  Adult 29 3.2(3.5) 49.9(7) 28.6(5.7) 6.8(5.5) 





Table 6.  
Explanation data (Chapter II, Study 3). Percentage of explanation types for each behavior, across 
each evaluation type. 
     




















        
Non-
conformity 
Not Okay 4-6 16 1.0(6.6) 13.0(4.8) 28.7(6.0) 29.3(8.2) 
        
Non-
conformity 
Okay 4-6 21 2.4(4.4) 3.6(3) 42.9(8.6) 22.2(7.4) 
        
Conformity Okay 4-6 25 8.8(8.3) 33.8(9.3) 9.8(3.8) 27.9(9) 







Figure 1. Example trial (Chapter II, Study 1).  
“Hibbles (pointing) eat these kind of berries and Glerks (pointing) eat these kinds of berries. 
Look, this Glerk (pointing to target) is eating these kind of berries. 
Evaluation: “Is it okay or not okay for this Glerk to eat these kind of berries?  
Negativity: [if participant evaluated this as not okay] “Is it a little bad, pretty bad, or very, very 
bad, for this Hibble to eat these kind of berries?”  








Figure 2. Disapproval data (Chapter II, Study 1). Mean frequency of disapproval of conformity 







Figure 3. Competition vignette (Chapter II, Study 2).  
Slide 1: “I’m going to tell you about two kinds of groups. This group is called Hibbles (pointing 
to left), and this group is called Glerks (pointing to right). Can you point to the Hibbles? Can you 
point to the Glerks?”  
Slide 2: “The Hibbles and the Glerks had a big contest against each other. They had a contest to 
see which group could build the tallest tower with these blocks. The Hibbles worked really hard 
to build a tall tower really fast and the Glerks worked really hard to build a tall tower really fast 
too! They each ran to get more and more blocks for their towers. Their towers got taller…” 
Slide 3: “…and taller.”  
Slide 4: “Each group worked against each other so they could make their tower really tall. 
Whichever group builds the tallest tower is going to get a really great prize. There weren’t 
enough blocks for everyone, so only one group would get it in the end.”  
Comprehension Check: “Were there enough blocks for everyone?” [if answered correctly; 
“Right, there weren’t enough blocks for everyone, so only one group would win and get a prize 




Figure 4. Cooperation vignette (Chapter II, Study 2). 
Slide 1: “I’m going to tell you about two kinds of groups. This group is called Hibbles (pointing 
to left), and this group is called Glerks (pointing to right). Can you point to the Hibbles? Can you 
point to the Glerks?” 
Slide 2: “The Hibbles and the Glerks played a big game together. They played a game where 
they built a really tall tower with these blocks. The Hibbles worked really hard to build a tall 
tower really fast and the Glerks worked really hard to build a tall tower really fast too! They each 
ran to get more and more blocks for the tower. The tower got taller…” 
Slide 3: “…and taller.”  
Slide 4: “Each group worked together so they could make the tower really tall. When the groups 
finish the tower together, they are both going to get a really great prize. There were enough 
blocks for everyone, so both groups would get a prize in the end.”  
Comprehension Check: “Were there enough blocks for everyone?” [if answered correctly; 
“Right, there were enough blocks for everyone, so both groups would win and both groups 




Figure 5. Disapproval data (Chapter II, Study 2). Mean frequency of disapproval of conformity 
and non-conformity across age groups and conditions. Scores could range from 0 to 4. Error bars 




Figure 6. Example trial (Chapter II, Study 3). 
 
“This one (pointing to left) eats these kind of berries and this one (pointing to right) eats these 
kind of berries. Look, this one (pointing to target) eats these kind of berries.  
 
Evaluation: “Is it okay or not okay for this one to eat these kind of berries?  
 
Negativity: [if participant evaluated this as not okay] “Is it a little bad, pretty bad, or very, very 
bad, for this one to eat these kind of berries?”  
 






Minimal perceptual and linguistic cues foster children’s prescriptive judgments 
Abstract 
In Chapter 2, I found that children used descriptive regularities of social groups (what is) 
to generate prescriptive judgments (what should be). In this chapter, I examined whether this 
tendency held when the regularities were introduced through group presence, category labels, or 
generic statements. Children (4-9 years; N = 203) were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions that manipulated how descriptive group regularities were presented: group presence 
(e.g., “These ones [a group of three individuals] eat this kind of berry”), category labels (e.g., 
[showing an individual] “This Hibble eats this kind of berry”), generic statements (e.g., [showing 
an individual] “Hibbles eat this kind of berry"), or control (e.g., [showing an individual] “This 
one eats this kind of berry”). Then, children saw conforming and non-conforming individuals 
and were asked to evaluate their behavior. As predicted, children evaluated non-conformity 
negatively in all but the control condition, demonstrating that minimal perceptual and linguistic 
cues provoked children to treat social groups as having normative force.
Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, an important open question was what information signaled to 
children that a feature was group-relevant, and thus normative. Roberts et al. (2017a) provided 
children with several converging cues: the groups consisted of individuals in sets of three 
(thereby highlighting group presence), they were labeled with a common noun (i.e., Hibble, 
Glerk), and they were described with generic statements in which properties were attributed to 
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categories (e.g., “Hibbles eat these kinds of berries”). When these cues were present, children 
made prescriptive judgments; when they were absent, children did not. Thus, although children 
used group regularities to generate prescriptive judgments, it remains unclear which cues or 
combination of cues shift a behavior from being a descriptive “is” to a prescriptive “should.” 
That is, are prescriptive judgments elicited by group presence, category labels, generic 
statements, or some combination of these three factors?  
Seeing a group of individuals engage in a common behavior has profound effects on our 
social cognition. Take as an example Asch's (1955) classic research on social pressure (i.e., 
normative social influence): Individuals confronted with three or more people who share a belief, 
feel the pressure to also hold that belief, even if they suspect the belief to be false. Thus, because 
the presence of a group is a strong predictor of conformity, one possibility is that simply seeing a 
group of individuals that share a common behavior will generate prescriptiveness (i.e., all 
individual group members should share that behavior). Indeed, recent research suggests that 
being exposed to a group of individuals who share common properties increases the likelihood of 
that group being perceived as coalitional, as well as the likelihood of stereotyping individuals 
within that group (e.g., Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003). 
Group labels (i.e., count nouns; Macnamara, 1982), even when only an individual group 
member is present, play a critical role in shaping young children’s categorization. Labels make 
categories more salient, encourage children to form new categories and treat them as stable, and 
promote category-based inferences (Baron, Dunham, Banaji, & Carey, 2014; Gelman & 
Markman, 1986; Graham, Keates, Vukatana, & Khu, 2013; Waxman & Markow, 1995). For 
example, Waxman (2010) introduced children to individuals (e.g., Black woman, White man), 
provided novel properties about those individuals (e.g., “is good at a game called zaggit”), and 
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assessed whether participants expected newly encountered individuals to share the novel 
property. When individuals received category labels (e.g., “This one is a Wayshan”), children 
expected newly encountered same-race and same-gender individuals to share the same property, 
whereas when individuals were not labeled (e.g., “This one eats big lunches”), they did not 
expect newly encountered same-race or same-gender individuals to share the same property. 
Thus, labels facilitated group-based inferences. However, this finding does not speak to whether 
labels, in addition, generate children’s prescriptive judgments toward novel groups.   
Labels may license stronger inferences when they are coupled with generic statements 
(e.g., expressions that refer to categories). For example, the generic statement “Hibbles eat this 
kind of berry” may license stronger inferences than the specific statement "These Hibbles eat this 
kind of berry", because the generic implies that the category is closely linked to the property, 
general across time and contexts, and indicative of commonalities shared among individual 
group members (Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Gelman et al., 2010; Graham, Nayer, & Gelman, 
2011; Prasada, 2000). Indeed, when 4-year-olds were presented with a completely novel 
category (i.e., Zarpies), they were more likely to make category-based inferences when Zarpies 
were introduced via generics (e.g., “Zarpies like to sing”) than when they were introduced via 
specific labels (e.g., “This Zarpie likes to sing”) or no labels (e.g., “This likes to sing”; Gelman 
et al., 2010; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012), demonstrating that generic statements, compared 
to labels alone, generate more category-based inferences, and suggesting they may likewise 
generate more prescriptive judgments.  
The present research tested the extent to which group presence, category labels, and 
generic statements bolstered children’s prescriptive judgments of group regularities. To do this, 
we presented children with two kinds of groups, and randomly assigned children to one of four 
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conditions in which we manipulated how the group regularities were conveyed: (a) group 
presence (each group included three individuals who were described without labels or generic 
statements), (b) labels (each group included one individual who was described with a category 
label but not a generic statement), (c) generic (each group included one individual who was 
described with a label and a generic statement), or (d) control (each group included one 
individual who was described without a label or generic statement). Because we wanted group 
membership to be apparent in all conditions, members of different groups were spatially 
segregated and wore distinct clothing patterns. Prior research indicates that such cues by 
themselves do not foster prescriptive judgments (Roberts et al., 2017a, Study 2). We predicted 
that (1) children would use group presence, category labels, and generic statements to make 
prescriptive judgments, (2) children would make fewer prescriptive judgments when not 
provided with these cues (thereby replicating Roberts et al., 2017a), and (3) children would make 
more prescriptive judgments when hearing generic statements than when hearing only labels. No 
additional a priori predictions were made regarding the relative effects of group presence, labels, 
and generic statements. We focused on the age groups of 4-6 and 7-9 years, given that Roberts et 
al. (2017a) found that this was when important developmental changes occurred on this task, and 
which other research shows captures significant changes in children’s social category concepts 
(Quintana, 1998; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Roberts & Gelman, 2015, 2017a). 
Method 
Participants 
Two age groups of children were included (N = 203): 4- to 6-year-olds (n = 106, 51% 
female, M age = 5 years and 6 months, range = 4 years and 1 month - 6 year and 11 months), and 
7- to 9-year-olds (n = 97; 61% female, M age = 8 years and 4 months, range = 7 years and 0 
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months to 9 years and 11 months). All children were recruited in the Midwest at two university-
affiliated museums. The sample was mostly white/European American (60% white/European 
American, 12% Asian American/Asian/Pacific Islander, 10% multiracial, 5% black/African 
American, 3% Hispanic/Latino, and 12% other or not reported). 
Materials and Procedure 
The task was adapted from Roberts et al. (2017a) and presented via Qualtrics. Children 
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: Group presence (i.e., sets of three individuals 
per group, which were spatially segregated, distinguished by clothing patterns, and presented 
without category labels or generic statements); Label (one individual per group, spatially 
segregated, distinguished by clothing patterns, and presented with category labels); Generic (one 
individual per group, spatially segregated, distinguished by clothing patterns, and presented with 
category labels and generic statements); and Control (one individual per group, spatially 
segregated, distinguished by clothing patterns, and presented without labels or generic 
statements). For sample trials see Figures 7 and 8.  
Conditions 
Presence. Children (4-6: n = 25, 7-9: n = 24) were introduced to two novel groups that 
were presented without category labels or generic statements: “I’m going to tell you about these 
ones (pointing) and these ones (pointing).” Each group consisted of three individuals (one set of 
three located on the left side of the screen, another set located on the right side of the screen), 
with group membership portrayed by clothing pattern (i.e., orange rectangles vs. green stripes). 
Next, children received eight test trials. Across all conditions, there were four behavioral 
domains: Food, Games, Language, and Music, and each behavior matched its corresponding 
group in color (e.g., green clothing pattern corresponded with a green musical note). On each 
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trial, children were given regularities for both groups and then shown a conforming or a non-
conforming individual. For example, “These ones (pointing to the group with orange rectangles) 
eat this kind of berry and these ones (pointing to the group with green stripes) eat this kind of 
berry. Look (revealing and pointing to an individual who either conformed or did not conform to 
their group), this one is eating this kind of berry.” 
Label. Children (4-6: n = 31, 7-9: n = 24) were introduced to two individuals who were 
spatially segregated, distinguished by clothing pattern (identical clothing to those in the group 
presence condition), and presented with contrasting category labels: “I’m going to tell you about 
these two. This one is a Hibble (pointing) and this one is a Glerk (pointing).” Next, children were 
told a fact about each individual and then introduced to other individuals who either conformed 
or did not conform to the property exhibited by the individual with the same name (eight trials). 
For example, “This Hibble eats this kind of berry (pointing) and this Glerk eats this kind of berry 
(pointing). Look (revealing and pointing to an individual who either conformed or did not 
conform to their labeled group), this Hibble is eating this kind of berry (pointing).” 
Generic. As in the Label condition, children (4-6: n = 26, 7-9: n = 25) were introduced to 
two individuals who were spatially segregated and distinguished by clothing pattern: “I’m going 
to tell you about these two. This one is a Hibble (pointing) and this one is a Glerk (pointing).” 
Next, children were told a fact about each individual and then introduced to conforming or non-
conforming individuals (eight trials). Unlike the Label condition, however, the initial facts were 
provided in the form of generic statements: For example, “Hibbles eat this kind of berry 
(pointing) and Glerks eat this kind of berry (pointing). Look (revealing and pointing to an 
individual who either conformed or did not conform to their generically-referenced group), this 
Hibble is eating this kind of berry (pointing).” 
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Control. Children (4-6: n = 24, 7-9: n = 24) were introduced to two individuals who were 
spatially segregated, distinguished by clothing pattern, but presented without category labels or 
generic statements (see also Roberts et al., 2017a, Study 2): “I’m going to tell you about these 
two - this one (pointing) and this one (pointing).” Children were then told a fact about each 
individual and introduced to conforming and non-conforming individuals. For example, “This 
one eats to this kind of berry (pointing) and this one eats this kind of berry (pointing). Look 
(revealing and pointing to an individual who either conformed or did not conform to the other 
individual with the same appearance), this one is eating this kind of berry (pointing).” 
Across all conditions, each participant saw eight trials. Four trials depicted a conforming 
individual and four trials depicted a non-conforming individual. Trials were presented in random 
order, and across participants the left-right position of the groups/individuals was 
counterbalanced. In the Label and Generic conditions, we also counterbalanced which label was 
associated with which clothing pattern.  
Measures and coding 
 First, children were asked whether or not the behaviors of the conforming/non-
conforming individuals were “okay” or “not okay” (evaluation, e.g., “Is it okay or not okay for 
this Hibble to eat this kind of berry?”). We calculated the frequency with which these evaluations 
occurred for both conformity and non-conformity trials (scores for each could range from 0 to 4), 
focusing on the frequency of “not okay” evaluations, which reflected disapproval, as the 
dependent variable. (Note that the frequency of “okay” and “not okay” responses were precise 
inverses.) Second, children were asked how bad or how good a specific behavior was. Children 
who evaluated behaviors as “not okay” were presented with a scale of three increasingly 
unhappy faces and were asked, “Is it a little bad, pretty bad, or very, very bad?” (1 = a little bad, 
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2 = pretty bad, 3 = very, very bad), and children who evaluated behaviors as “okay” were 
presented with a scale of three increasingly happy faces and were asked, “Is it a little good, 
pretty good, or very, very good?” (1 = a little good, 2 = pretty good, 3 = very, very good).  
Third, children were asked to explain their evaluations (e.g., “Why is it not okay for this 
one to eat this kind of berry?”). Responses were coded into five types based on previous research 
(Roberts et al., 2017a; Rhodes, 2014): (a) norm-based (b) group-based (c) individual-based, (d) 
similarity-based, and (e) other (see Table 1 for a description of the coding scheme). Codes were 
not mutually exclusive, so children could appeal to multiple explanation types within a single 
response. These responses were coded by two research assistants who were blind to hypotheses 
of the study (Cohen’s kappa = .77) and disagreements were resolved by discussion. We 
calculated the percentage of times that each type of explanation was provided, out of the total 
number of trials, for each response type (e.g., a child who disapproved of non-conformity on 4 
trials and gave a norm-based explanation on 1 of those trials was coded as having given norm-
based explanations for disapproved non-conformity 25% of the time).  
As a comprehension check, at the end of the task, children were asked, “What does it 
mean for something to be not okay?” (open-ended) and “Does 'not okay' mean that someone 
should or should not do something?” (0 = should, 1 = should not). Only children who indicated 
norm-based reasoning in their open-ended question (e.g., “you aren’t supposed/allowed to do it”, 
“it means something bad will happen”) and said that “not okay” means someone “should not” do 
something were included in the final sample. Seven children did not meet these criteria and were 
therefore excluded from the final sample. 
Parent survey. For exploratory purposes, parents were also given the option of 
completing a survey (81% response rate) adapted from Feldman (2003) that assessed their views 
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on authoritarian parenting (α = .51), conformity (α = .41), and respect for common norms (α = 
.61). However, these measure yielded low reliabilities and were not related with children’s 
responses, and are therefore not reported further.   
Results 
 There were no significant effects of any of the counterbalancing factors or of the 
behavioral domains, so the data were collapsed across these variables. All significant effects at 
the p < .05 level were followed by Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons. 
Disapproval toward non-conformity and conformity 
We first tested whether children were more disapproving of non-conformity than of 
conformity, and whether their rates of disapproval varied across conditions. To test this, we 
conducted a 2 (age group: 4-6, 7-9) x 2 (behavior: conformity, non-conformity) x 4 (condition: 
Group Presence, Label, Generic, Control) repeated measures ANOVA with behavior as a within-
subjects variable, age group and condition as between-subjects variables, and the frequency of 
not-okay evaluations as the dependent variable. A main effect of behavior, F(1, 195) = 139.83, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .42, showed that non-conformity was indeed disapproved of more frequently than 
conformity, and a main effect of age group, F(1, 195) = 10.23, p = .002, ηp
2 = .05, showed that 4- 
to 6-year-olds were more disapproving than 7- to 9-year-olds. There was also a main effect of 
condition, F(3, 195) = 4.93, p = .003, ηp
2 = .07. Planned comparisons showed that compared to 
the Control condition, disapproval was higher in the Generic condition (p = .001). There was also 
a significant interaction of behavior and condition, F(3, 195) = 8.34, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11. Planned 
comparisons revealed that non-conformity was disapproved more frequently than conformity in 
the Group Presence, Label, and Generic conditions (ps < .001), but not in the Control condition. 
For conformity, disapproval did not differ significantly between any of the conditions (ps = 
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1.00). For non-conformity, disapproval was lowest in the Control condition compared to all other 
three conditions (ps < .012), and disapproval did not differ across the three experimental 
conditions (ps > .55). There were no interactions involving age group.  
We next conducted one-sample t-tests to test responses against chance (i.e., 2). When 
looking at disapproval for conformity, both age groups across all four conditions were below 
chance (thereby indicating approval). When looking at disapproval for non-conformity, 4- to 6-
year-olds in the Generic condition were above chance, 4- to 6-year-olds in the Control condition 
were marginally below chance, and 7- to 9-year-olds in the Control condition were below 
chance. All other groups were at chance. These statistics are presented in Table 7 and the data 
are presented graphically in Figure 9. Non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests provided 
further insight into the chance-level responses (see Table 8 for all data and statistics). Overall, 
these analyses revealed that in the experimental conditions, regarding non-conformity, half of the 
children most often approved and half of the children most often disapproved (though this was 
not the case for 4- to 6-year-olds in the Generic Statement condition). See the General 
Discussion for insight into these response patterns.  
Negativity toward non-conformity 
Next, we focused only on the children who disapproved of non-conformity on at least one 
trial and were asked how bad the behavior was (1 = kind of bad, 2 = pretty bad, 3 = very, very 
bad; n = 138). A univariate ANOVA with age group (2: 4-6, 7-9) as a between-subjects variable 
and negativity as the dependent variable (i.e., average rating score across non-conformity trials 
on which children indicated “not okay”; scores could range from 1 to 3) yielded a main effect of 
age group, F(1, 130) = 21.46, p < .001, ηp
2 = .14, showing that 4- to 6-year-olds (M = 2.47, SE = 
.08) were more negative than 7- to 9-year-olds (M = 1.85, SE = .09). This effect was qualified by 
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a significant interaction of age group and condition, F(3, 138) = 3.76, p = .02, ηp
2 = .07. Four-to 
six-year-olds were more negative than 7- to 9-year-olds in the Control condition (4-6: M = 2.70, 
SE = .18; 7-9: M = 1.34, SE = .22, p < .001) and Group Presence condition (4-6: M = 2.66, SE = 
.15; 7-9: M = 2.09, SE = .17, p = .012). The two age groups did not differ in their negativity in 
either the Label condition (4-6: M = 2.19, SE = .14; 7-9: M = 2.00, SE = .17, p = .41) or the 
Generic condition (4-6: M = 2.33, SE = .14; 7-9: M = 1.93, SE = .15, p = .057), with ratings in 
both age groups corresponding roughly to the evaluation that the non-conformity was “pretty 
bad”.  
Positivity toward non-conformity 
We next focused only on the children who approved of non-conformity on at least one 
trial and were asked how good the behavior was (1 = kind of good, 2 = pretty good, 3 = very, 
very good; n = 125). A univariate ANOVA with age group (2: 4-6, 7-9) as a between-subjects 
variable and positivity as the dependent variable (i.e., average rating score across non-conformity 
trials on which they indicated “okay”; scores could range from 1 to 3) yielded only a main effect 
of age group, F(1, 117) = 4.37, p = .039, ηp
2 = .04, showing that 4- to 6-year-olds were more 
positive than 7- to 9-year-olds (4-6: M = 2.33, SE = .07; 7-9: M = 2.09, SE = .08) when 
approving of non-conformity. 
Positivity toward conformity 
 Lastly, we focused on the children who approved of conformity on at least one trial and 
were asked how good the behavior was (1 = kind of good, 2 = pretty good, 3 = very, very good; n 
= 196). A univariate ANOVA with age group (2: 4-6, 7-9) as a between-subjects variable and 
positivity as the dependent variable (i.e., average rating score across conformity trials on which 
they indicated “okay”; scores could range from 1 to 3) yielded a main effect of age group, F(1, 
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188) = 8.71, p = .004, ηp
2 = .04, showing that 4- to 6-year-olds were more positive than 7- to 9-
year-olds (4-6: M = 2.59, SE = .05; 7-9: M = 2.38, SE = .05) when approving of conformity.  
Explanations 
We next analyzed the explanations that children provided after they were asked why they 
approved or disapproved of a given behavior (e.g., “Why is it okay for this one to eat this kind of 
berry?”). Explanations were given for three response types: Disapproved non-conformity, 
approved non-conformity, and approved conformity. Responses for disapproved conformity 
were not analyzed because this response was rarely given. We focused on the frequency of the 
four primary explanation types (norm-based, group-based, individual-based, similarity-based) 
within each response type (e.g., approved conformity), not including “other” miscellaneous 
explanations, and did not statistically compare across response type because not all participants 
provided each type of response. The percentage of times each explanation type was provided, out 
of the total number of trials, was analyzed via repeated measures ANOVAs in which age group 
and condition were between-subjects variables, explanation type was a within-subjects variable, 
and the percentage of given explanations was the dependent variable. The Huynh-Feldt 
correction, which adjusts the degrees of freedom for the calculated F values (Field, 2011; Huynh 
& Feldt, 1976), was used because the explanation data violated the repeated measures 
assumption of sphericity. See Tables 9 and 10 for all explanation data.  
Explanations about disapproved non-conformity 
 Focusing on children who evaluated non-conformity as not okay (n = 130), we found a 
significant main effect of age group, F(1, 122) = 6.70, p = .011, ηp
2 = .05, a significant difference 
in explanation type, F(2.77, 337.62) = 17.05, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12, an interaction of age group and 
explanation type, F(2.67, 337.62) = 4.20, p = .006, ηp
2 = .03, an interaction of explanation type 
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and condition, F(8.30, 337.62) = 3.55, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08, and an interaction of age group, 
explanation type, and condition, F(8.30, 337.62) = 1.96, p = .048, ηp
2 = .05. Four- to six-year-
olds gave mostly similarity-based explanations, and they did so at similar rates across all 
conditions, whereas 7- to 9-year-olds gave mostly group-based explanations and they did so most 
often in the Label and Generic conditions (though in the Group Presence condition they gave 
mostly similarity-based explanations).  
Explanations about approved non-conformity 
Focusing on participants who approved of non-conformity (n = 118), we found a 
significant main effect of age group, F(1, 110) = 9.71, p = .002, ηp
2 = .08, a significant difference 
in explanation type, F(2.16, 237.53) = 26.40, p < .001, ηp
2 = .19, and a significant interaction of 
age group and explanation type, F(2.16, 237.53) = 2.16, p = .001, ηp
2 = .07. Both age groups 
gave mostly individual-based explanations, though 7- to nine-year-olds did so to a greater extent 
than did 4- to 6-year-olds. 
Explanations about approved conformity 
Focusing on participants who approved of conformity (n = 195), we found an interaction 
of age group and explanation type, F(2.86, 535.38) = 3.27, p = .021, ηp
2 = .02. The 4- to 6-year-
old group gave more similarity-based explanations than norm-based explanations, and the 7- to 
9-year-old group gave more group-based, individual-based, and similarity-based explanations 
than norm-based explanations.  
Discussion 
 Children take what is to infer what should be (Kenward, 2012; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 
2013), even with regard to unfamiliar, third-party groups engaged in morally neutral behaviors 
(Roberts et al., 2017a). That is, if young children are shown a group that is described as sharing a 
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common property (i.e., descriptive regularity), children infer that individual group members 
should share that property and that it is bad if they do not (i.e., prescriptive judgment). In the 
present research, we tested the extent to which this descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency was 
facilitated by attention to group presence, category labels, or generic statements. Indeed, when 
group regularities were conveyed by showing multiple individuals engaged in a common 
behavior (i.e., group presence), words that highlighted an individuals’ group membership (i.e., 
category labels), or statements that associated group membership with specific properties (i.e., 
generic statements), children disapproved of non-conformity (consistent with our first 
prediction). In a control condition that included none of these factors, however, children were 
significantly less likely to disapprove of non-conformity (consistent with our second prediction), 
demonstrating that when the emphasis was on individuals and not groups, children were less 
prescriptive (see also Study 2 in Roberts et al., 2017a). The ease with which group-based, 
prescriptive reasoning is elicited, combined with its early emergence in younger children, 
suggests that such reasoning may be a fundamental aspect of human social cognition.  
We also note that the generic statement condition was the only condition in which 4- to 6-
year-olds disapproved of non-conformity above chance levels, and in which they disapproved 
more often than they approved. At the same time, response patterns in the generic condition did 
not differ significantly from those in the other experimental conditions. Future research would be 
needed to determine whether or not generic statements may be more powerful than group 
presence or category labels alone in fostering prescriptive judgments (consistent with our third 
prediction and with previous research; Gelman et al., 2010; Rhodes et al., 2012). For example, a 
more fine-grained scale to assess the degree of negativity that children feel toward non-
conformity may be more sensitive to condition differences in this age group. At minimum, these 
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data are consistent with prior research indicating that generics help children learn about groups, 
guide their expectations about individuals, and help them generate inferences about future 
behaviors (e.g., Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Gelman, 2003, Gelman et al., 2010; Graham et al., 
2011; Prasada, 2000), and further suggest that generics may preferentially license children’s 
prescriptive judgments.  
One unexpected finding was that younger children rarely used norm-based reasoning 
(e.g., “They shouldn’t do that”) to explain why they disapproved of non-conformity, in contrast 
to earlier work (Roberts et al., 2017a). One possibility is that, although group presence, category 
labels, and generic statements elicit disapproval and negativity, they may only be collectively 
strong enough to elicit norm-based justifications; perhaps a combination of the three conveys a 
stronger regularity that licenses children to make strong normative justifications. Future work is 
needed to test this empirically. For now, though, the present data indicate that group presence, 
category labels, and generic statements license prescriptiveness in the form of disapproval and 
negativity.  
Also of note, younger children tended to respond in a more extreme manner than older 
children: they were more disapproving than older children, on both conformity and non-
conformity trials, and were more negative on the negativity scale and more positive on the 
positivity scale. One interpretation of these patterns is that younger children are more attentive to 
both conformity and non-conformity, and therefore feel especially positive about conformity and 
especially negative about non-conformity. This interpretation aligns with recent research 
suggesting that 3-year-olds are significantly more troubled by norm violations than are 5-year-
olds (Hardecker et al., 2016). Regardless, of primary interest here was the directionality of 
children’s responses, which varied as a function of the specific behaviors they saw (i.e., non-
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conformity vs. conformity). That is, younger children’s more extreme responses are independent 
of the finding that they were systematic in their responses: in the experimental conditions, they 
were more disapproving of non-conformity than of conformity, and more approving of 
conformity than of non-conformity. 
An important question for future research is why the children interpret group presence, 
labels, and generic statements as indicative of what is normatively correct. One possibility is that 
each of these features provides children with the information that a given property is 
systematically shared among a group of individuals, rather than possessed by only one. Once 
children take note of a descriptive regularity, they may reason that adherence and conformity to 
group regularities is critical for individual and group functioning (Tomasello, 2016), and 
subsequently interpret the regularity as having prescriptive force. In other words, children may 
be prepared to detect group regularities, which could be signaled multiply by group presence, 
category labels, and generic statements.  
A second possibility (not mutually exclusive from the first) is that such cues encourage 
children to essentialize the social group in question (see Bigler & Liben, 2006 for a related 
theoretical model). For example, when children see a group of individuals who share common 
features (e.g., people with dark skin live on the other side of town), they may come to 
conceptualize those features as essential to their identity, and subsequently use group 
membership as a basis for prescriptiveness (e.g., people with dark skin should live on the other 
side of town). The explanation data support this possibility, showing that in the absence of labels, 
children justified their prescriptiveness through similarity-based explanations. Similarly, labels 
and generic statements could signal to children that that group membership is salient and 
important, subsequently influencing them to interpret group membership as essential and 
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therefore prescriptive. Indeed, in both of these conditions, both age groups most often appealed 
to group-based explanations (i.e., they often appealed to the category label, which was given to 
them in both of these conditions). This finding is consistent with recent research suggesting that 
when given race-based labels, children (ages 5 to 10) are especially likely to essentialize race 
(Roberts & Gelman, 2017b). Future research is needed to systematically test the extent to which 
essentialist reasoning mediates the descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency detected here, which may 
also help understand the non-random individual response patterns. Recall from the non-
parametric tests that children were often split in their evaluations of non-conformity: half of the 
children most often disapproved, whereas the other half most often approved (excluding 4- to 6-
year-olds in the generic statement condition). One possibility is that children who interpreted the 
properties as “essential” to the group were more likely to disapprove of non-conformity. Indeed, 
recent work suggests that children who attribute behaviors to groups (e.g., Hibbles eat that kind 
of berry because of something about Hibbles), rather to properties (e.g., Hibbles eat that kind of 
berry because of something about that berry), are more likely to conceptualize non-conformity as 
a norm violation (see Tworek & Cimpian, 2016).  
 In conclusion, the data presented in Chapter 3 contribute to a growing body of literature 
on children’s reasoning about norms (Engelmann et al., 2016; Riggs & Young, 2016; Schmidt, 
Hardecker, et al., 2016), showing that such reasoning influences children’s descriptive-to-
prescriptive tendency even under minimal contexts with minimal cues to group regularities. 
Stated more plainly, when children see a group of individuals, hear a category label, or hear that 
label explicitly associated with behaviors, they believe that individuals within that group should 
conform, and that it is bad if they don’t. Nevertheless, because the data in Chapter 2 and 3 were 
derived from exclusively U.S. children (see also Conry-Murray & Turiel, 2012; Cooley & 
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Killen, 2015; Josephs, Kushnir, Gräfenhain, & Rakoczy, 2016; Kalish, 2012), and therefore 
limited my understanding of children’s normative reasoning across human populations, I 





Disapproval data (Chapter III). Means, standard errors, and one-sample t-test statistics 
comparing average disapproval frequencies against chance (i.e., 2) across age groups, conditions, 
















       
4-6 Presence Non-conformity 2.44(.34) 1.29 .21 .26 
  Conformity 0.64(.21) -6.56 < .001 1.31 
       
 Label Non-conformity 2.06(.29) .23 .823 .04 
  Conformity 0.81(.21) -5.56 < .001 .99 
       
 Generic Non-conformity 2.85(.31) 2.71 .012 .53 
  Conformity 0.92(.28) -3.81 .001 .75 
       
 Control Non-conformity 1.38(.32) -1.97 .061 .40 
  Conformity 1.04(.24) -3.92 .001 .80 
       
7-9 Presence Non-conformity 2.25(.37) .67 .509 .13 
  Conformity 0.17(.10) -18.65 < .001 3.81 
       
 Label Non-conformity 2.13(.39) .32 .755 .06 
  Conformity 0.25(.11) -16.13 < .001 3.29 
       
 Generic Non-conformity 2.44(.34) 1.27 .217 .25 
  Conformity 0.16(.07) -24.59 < .001 4.92 
       
 Control Non-conformity 0.75(.27) -4.62 < .001 .94 
  Conformity 0.25(.15) -11.63 < .001 2.37 







Non-parametric data (Chapter III). Number of participants who more often approved (“okay”), 
more often disapproved (“not okay”), or approved and disapproved equally (Tie), as a function 








































  Conformity 20 1 4 -3.81 <.001 .76 
         
 Label Non-conformity 12 13 6 .239 .81 .04 
  Conformity 24 3 4 -3.79 <.001 .68 
         
 Generic Non-conformity 7 18 1 2.51 .012 .49 
  Conformity 20 5 1 -3.06 .002 .60 
         
 Control Non-conformity 16 7 1 -1.79 .07 .37 
  Conformity 16 3 5 -3.07 .002 .63 
         
7-9 Presence Non-conformity 9 12 3 .688 .49 .14 
  Conformity 23 0 1 -4.63 < .001 .95 
         
 Label Non-conformity 12 12 0 -.56 .57 .11 
  Conformity 23 0 1 -4.51 < .001 .92 
         
 Generic Non-conformity 9 14 2 1.36 .17 .28 
  Conformity 25 0 0 -4.72 < .001 .94 
         
 Control Non-conformity 21 3 0 -3.12 .002 .64 








Explanation data (Chapter III, younger children). Percentage of 4- to 6-year-olds’ explanation types for each behavior, across 
conditions and evaluations types, separately for “not okay” and “okay” responses. 
     





















         
4-6 Presence Non-conformity Not okay 20 6(7) 25(8) 10(4) 35(9) 
  Non-conformity Okay 11 0 5(5) 19(10) 14(9) 
  Conformity Okay 24 10(5) 17(7) 15(6) 29(7) 
         
 Label Non-conformity Not okay 23 18(7) 22(7) 7(3) 31(8) 
  Non-conformity Okay 21 1(3) 4(4) 33(7) 18(7) 
  Conformity Okay 29 7(4) 17(6) 25(6) 31(7) 
         
 Generic  Non-conformity Not okay 22 18(7) 11(7) 2(3) 33(8) 
  Non-conformity Okay 10 15(5) 9(6) 15(11) 21(10) 
  Conformity Okay 25 8(5) 17(7) 7(6) 25(7) 
         
 Control Non-conformity Not okay 11 15(9) 0 2(5) 41(12) 
  Non-conformity Okay 19 1(3) 0 12(8) 20(7) 
  Conformity Okay 23 15(5) 23(7) 8(6) 19(7) 
         
Note. Scores represent percentage of each explanation type out of the total number of trials. Individual explanations could have been 
coded as of more than one type, and explanations that did not fit any of the coded types are not reported (which is why the percentages 




Table 10.  
Explanation data (Chapter III, older children). Percentage of 7- to 9-year-olds’ explanation types for each behavior, across conditions 














Note. Scores represent percentage of each explanation type out of the total number of trials. Individual explanations could have been 
coded as of more than one type, and explanations that did not fit any of the coded types are not reported (which is why the percentages 
can add to more than or less than 100). Data for disapproved (“not okay”) conformity are not presented because this response was 
rarely given. 
     





















         
7-9 Presence Non-conformity Not okay 16 22(8) 41(9) 2(4) 47(10) 
  Non-conformity Okay 12 2(4) 19(5) 56(10) 25(10) 
  Conformity Okay 22 6(5) 23(7) 31(7) 23(8) 
         
 Label Non-conformity Not okay 13 23(9) 69(10) 0 21(11) 
  Non-conformity Okay 13 0 10(5) 47(10) 8(9) 
  Conformity Okay 24 10(5) 38(7) 30(6) 17(7) 
         
 Generic  Non-conformity Not okay 18 21(7) 49(8) 2(4) 10(09) 
  Non-conformity Okay 11 9(4) 14(5) 30(10) 7(9) 
  Conformity Okay 25 8(5) 21(7) 14(6) 22(7) 
         
 Control Non-conformity Not okay 7 7(11) 0 14(6) 54(15) 
  Non-conformity Okay 21 5(3) 0(4) 54(7) 15(7) 
  Conformity Okay 23 0 11(7) 33(6) 22(7) 
         




Figure 7. Example trial (Chapter III, Group Presence condition). 
“These ones (pointing to the group with the orange rectangles) eat this kind of berry and these 
ones (pointing to the group with the green stripes) eat this kind of berry. Look, this one (pointing 
to target) is eating this kind of berries. 
Evaluation: “Is it okay or not okay for this one to eat this kind of berry?  
Negativity: [if child evaluated this as not okay] “Is it a little bad, pretty bad, or very, very bad, 
for this one to eat this kind of berry?”  
Explanation: “Why is it [okay or not okay] for this one to eat this kind of berry?”  
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Figure 8. Example trial (Chapter III, Label, Generic, and Control conditions).   
Label Condition: “I’m going to tell you about these two. This one is a Hibble (pointing to the 
individual with orange rectangles) and this one is a Glerk (pointing to the one with green 
stripes). This Hibble eats this kind of berry (pointing) and this Glerk eats this kind of berry 
(pointing). Look (revealing and pointing to an individual who either conformed or did not 
conform to their labeled group), this Hibble is eating this kind of berry (pointing).” 
Generic Condition: “I’m going to tell you about these two. This one is a Hibble (pointing to the 
individual with orange rectangles) and this one is a Glerk (pointing to the individual with green 
stripes). Hibbles eat this kind of berry (pointing) and Glerks eat this kind of berry (pointing). 
Look (revealing and pointing to an individual who either conformed or did not conform to their 
generically-referenced group), this Hibble is eating this kind of berry (pointing).” 
Control Condition: “I’m going to tell you about these two. This one (pointing to the individual 
with orange rectangles) and this one (pointing to the individual with green stripes). This one eats 
this kind of berry (pointing) and this one eats this kind of berry (pointing). Look (revealing and 
pointing to an individual either conformed or did not conform to the other individual with the 
same appearance), this one is eating this kind of berry (pointing).” 
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Figure 9. Disapproval data (Chapter III). Mean frequency of disapproval of conformity and non-
conformity across age groups and conditions. Scores could range from 0 to 4. Error bars display 
standard errors. 
 




Children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency replicates (and varies) cross-culturally 
Abstract 
Because the previous studies were conducted with U.S. samples, only, I assessed here 
whether the descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency held in a sample of children (ages 4 to 13) and 
adults (ages 18 to 40) from mainland China. Participants were introduced to novel groups (i.e., 
Hibbles and Glerks) who engaged in contrasting morally neutral behaviors (e.g., listening to 
different kinds of music) and then to conforming and non-conforming individuals (e.g., a Hibble 
who listened to music more typical of Glerks). Like U.S. children, Chinese children disapproved 
of non-conformity and rates of disapproval declined with age. However, compared to U.S. 
children, younger Chinese children (ages 4 to 6) rated non-conformity more disapprovingly, and 
unlike U.S. adults, Chinese adults rated non-conformity more negatively than conformity. 
Moreover, compared to U.S. participants, Chinese participants across all age groups more often 
appealed to norm-based explanations when justifying their disapproval. These data provide a 
cross-cultural replication of children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency but also reveal cross-
cultural variation, and they have implications for understanding the mechanisms that underlie 
stereotyping and norm enforcement.  
Introduction 
 The previous studies provided new insight into children’s normative reasoning and 
highlighted the profound implications group concepts have for stereotyping and prescriptive 
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reasoning. If a group is characterized by a property, children believe that individual group 
members should be characterized by that property. The readiness, robustness, and ease with 
which children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency is elicited may be evolutionarily rooted in 
humans’ group-based way of life. That is, recognizing and conforming to group norms is 
adaptive for the self (e.g., leading to social acceptance and opportunities for collaborative 
learning) and the group (e.g., leading to more efficient group functioning and strength against 
competing groups; Tomasello, 2016). Thus, an individual who can quickly learn, adopt, and 
enforce their group’s norms is a model group member as they increase their own (and their 
group’s) functioning, resources, and survival. 
If normative reasoning is indeed evolutionarily rooted and therefore a central and 
fundamental aspect of human cognition (Tomasello, 2016), children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive 
tendency, even under novel and minimal conditions, should emerge cross-culturally. To date, 
however, this is unclear, as Roberts et al. (2017a, 2017b) conducted their research with U.S. 
samples. Indeed, the overreliance on samples recruited from WEIRD cultures (Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) is a problem for the general field of psychology 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), the subfield of developmental psychology (Legare & 
Harris, 2016), and the specific research on children’s normative reasoning, which includes 
mostly data derived from Germany, the U.S., or Sweden (for examples, see Cooley & Killen, 
2015; Göckeritz et al., 2014; Josephs et al., 2016; Kenward, 2012; Roberts et al., 2017a, 2017b; 
Samland et al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2016; but see research on "over-imitation," reviewed below, 
for a notable exception). Because of this, our theoretical models are founded upon the 
assumption that WEIRD cultures provide a standard from which to understand normative 
reasoning.  
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In an effort to test the extent to which children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency, 
with regard to novel groups engaged in innocuous behaviors, replicates (and varies) cross-
culturally, and to move toward more inclusive, diverse, and generalizable data, we examined 
whether children recruited in mainland China, like children recruited in the U.S., interpreted 
descriptive group regularities as having normative force. Our focus on Chinese participants was 
motivated by previous research demonstrating that Chinese children, compared to U.S. children, 
engage in more group-based reasoning (as reviewed below), suggesting that Chinese children 
may also more often use descriptive group regularities to make prescriptive judgments. Thus, 
comparing children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency across two distinct cultures (i.e., U.S. 
and China) permitted a test of the replicability of previously detected effects with U.S. children 
(Roberts et al., 2017a, 2017b), while also testing for cross-cultural variation. 
 As discussed above, because normative reasoning may have an evolutionary basis 
(Tomasello, 2016), and because children quickly and intuitively enforce normative conformity 
(Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013), it is possible that Chinese children, like U.S. children, would show 
a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency. Further evidence for this possibility is cross-cultural 
similarity in children’s tendency to “over-imitate” (i.e., faithfully reproduce modeled actions), 
suggesting that children’s adherence to norms is a universal component of human cognition (see 
Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). Specifically, children across several diverse contexts (e.g., 
Aboriginal and Western Australia, Botswana, England, South Africa, Sweden) interpret the 
actions of adults as normative, imitating them precisely, even if they understand that the actions 
are inconsequential for achieving a goal (e.g., tapping a stick on the outside of a box before using 
it to dislodge a bolt; Horner & Whiten, 2005; Kenward, 2012; Nielsen & Mushin, 2014). 
Because children across diverse cultural contexts interpret neutral behaviors as normative in their 
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imitations, they may also interpret neutral descriptive group regularities as normative. Critically, 
though, the extent to which children engage in normative reasoning, including the extent to 
which they engage in imitative behavior, varies cross-culturally. For example, children in 
Vanuatu, a Pacific island nation, compared to children in the U.S., show higher rates of imitation 
(Clegg & Legare, 2016, see also Berl & Hewlett, 2015). Clegg and Legare (2016) argue that this 
cross-cultural variation could stem from non-Western cultures placing greater value on social 
conformity (see also Little, Carver, & Legare, 2016; Strachan, Samuel, & Takaro, 2007).  
Indeed, in their seminal review, Markus and Kitayama (1991) discussed how people in 
Eastern cultures, such as China, tend to hold an interdependent view of the self, leading them to 
value social responsibility, interconnectedness, group solidarity, and fitting in. In contrast, people 
in Western cultures, such as the U.S., tend to hold an independent view of the self, which entails 
valuing self-expression, autonomy, uniqueness, and standing out (see also Henrich et al., 2010). 
There is of course variation in the degree to which individuals within cultures hold certain 
ideologies (e.g., not every person in the U.S. values independence over interdependence), though 
at the aggregate level, these cultural differences are well documented (see Oyserman, Coon, & 
Kemmelmeier, 2002), and they have important implications for behavior and social cognition. 
For example, Wang, Leichtman, and Davies (2000) documented that U.S. and Chinese families 
provided their children with different frameworks from which to create and understand 
narratives: storytelling within U.S. families typically involved reference to individual feelings, 
thoughts, and opinions, whereas storytelling within Chinese families more often involved 
reference to social relationships, rules, and responsibilities. Similarly, Miller, Wiley, Fung, and 
Liang (1997) found that storytelling within U.S. families involved reference to past positive 
behavior, which parents used for entertainment and affirmation purposes, whereas storytelling 
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within Taiwanese families involved reference to past transgressions, which parents used for 
moral socialization purposes. Cultural differences such as these have important implications for 
children’s social cognition (Wang, 2016). For example, Li and Wang (2004) found that U.S. 
children believed that learning improved the individual (e.g., self-growth), whereas Chinese 
children believed that learning improved the larger collective (e.g., moral development). 
Relatedly, Wang (2004) asked children to recollect an early memory and to describe themselves 
and found that U.S. children tended to reference personal emotions and opinions, whereas 
Chinese children tended to reference social interactions and group activities (for comparable 
findings from adult samples, see Wang, 2001). In other work, Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, and 
Lee (2007) found that Chinese children (compared to Canadian children) were more likely to 
disadvantage an individual to help a group than to disadvantage a group to help an individual (Fu 
et al., 2007), suggesting that they valued group needs over individual needs. Thus, because 
culture contributes to differences in children’s behavior and social cognition, it may also 
contribute to differences in children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency. 
 Given the cross-cultural differences reviewed above, we were interested in the extent to 
which children’s descriptive tendency replicated and varied cross-culturally. We examined 
whether Chinese children (ages 4 to 13), like same-aged U.S. children, used descriptive group 
regularities to make prescriptive judgments. As in Roberts et al. (2017a, 2017b), we introduced 
children to novel groups: Hibbles and Glerks, who were characterized in terms of morally neutral 
behaviors (e.g., the kind of music they listened to), and then to a series of conforming and non-
conforming individuals (e.g., a Hibble who listened to music more typical of Glerks). We then 
measured children’s disapproval of the behavior, negativity toward disapproved behaviors, and 
open-ended explanations regarding how they justified their evaluations. Including open-ended 
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responses was important, as they can be a more culturally sensitive method for detecting 
variation in children’s concepts; they permit participants to share their own perspectives, use 
their own vocabularies, and generate their own responses (Hart & Edelstein, 1992). We focused 
on 4- to 13-year-olds because this permitted a direct comparison to the age range in Roberts et al. 
(2017a), and because important developmental changes involving social concepts occur 
throughout these years (Bigler & Liben, 2006; Quintana, 1998; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; 
Roberts & Gelman, 2015).  
 I had several hypotheses. First, because a preference for normative conformity may be 
evolutionarily rooted (Tomasello, 2016), and because early on in development children often 
take a strong normative stance (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013), we hypothesized that Chinese 
children, like U.S. children in previous research, would use descriptive group regularities (what 
is) to generate prescriptive judgments (what should be). That is, we predicted they would 
disapprove of non-conformity, evaluate it negatively, and use norm-based reasoning when 
explaining their evaluations (H1). Second, because Chinese children, like U.S. children, become 
increasingly likely with age to consider individual traits and attributes in their social reasoning 
(Wang, 2004), we hypothesized that with age, Chinese children would be more approving of 
non-conforming individuals (H2). Notably, however, an alternative hypothesis was that by virtue 
of having greater experience with socialization and enculturation of the concept of 
interconnectedness, with age, Chinese children would be more disapproving of non-conforming 
individuals. Third, because, Chinese culture, on average, is more likely than U.S. culture to value 
interdependence, we hypothesized that Chinese participants would be more likely than U.S. 
participants to show a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency. Alternatively, because of the recent 
Westernization of Chinese culture (e.g., economic development, urbanization, increases in 
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formal education; see Pingali, 2006; Wu, 2009; Zeng & Greenfield, 2015), there may be no 
differences between Chinese and U.S. participants. To test for cross-cultural differences, we 
compared the data from the present research, which were collected in China, to the data collected 
by Roberts et al. (2017a), which were collected in the Midwestern U.S.  
Method 
Participants 
 In the People’s Republic of China, four age groups of participants were included (N = 
172): thirty-six 4- to 6-year-olds (39% female, M age = 4 years and 8 months, range = 4 years 
and 1 month to 6 years and 10 months), thirty-seven 7- to 9-year-olds (51% female, M age = 8 
years and 5 months, range = 7 years and 2 months to 9 years and 11 months), forty-eight 10- to 
13-year-olds (56% female, M age = 11 years, range = 10 years to 13 years and 9 months), and 
fifty-one adults (49% female, M age = 24, range = 18-40). All participants were recruited and 
tested by the second author. Children of the 4-6 age group were recruited and tested in a 
kindergarten, and children of other age groups were recruited and tested in an elementary school, 
both of which were located in a southwestern county in the Hubei Province of Central China, 
which has a population of approximately 500,000 residents; the Hubei Province is 
demographically 96% ethnic Han Chinese. Non-parent adults were recruited and tested at local 
cafés in a metropolis near the city as well as through word-of-mouth. In school, all children 
spoke Standard Mandarin Chinese, but at home, most of them spoke a local dialect of Mandarin 
Chinese. 
Materials and procedure 
 The method was adapted from previous research (Roberts et al., 2017a) and presented via 
Qualtrics. The materials used in Roberts et al. (2017a) were translated from English into Chinese 
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by the second author, and then back-translated by one bilingual researcher to verify accuracy. 
First, participants were introduced to cartoon drawings of novel groups, “希博” (i.e., Hibbles) 
and “格里克” (i.e., Glerks), and were told, “I’m going to tell you about two kinds of groups. 
This group (pointing) is called Hibbles, and this group (pointing) is called Glerks.” Group 
membership was portrayed by clothing pattern (green stripes, orange triangles) and category 
labels (Hibbles, Glerks), and each group consisted of three individuals located on one side of the 
screen (left or right). Following the introduction of the novel groups, participants were given 
eight test trials presented in random order. Half of the trials depicted a non-conforming 
individual and the other half depicted a conforming individual. Across the eight trials, there were 
four behavioral domains: Music, Food, Games, and Language, with each behavior corresponding 
to the group in color (e.g., orange clothing pattern corresponded with an orange musical note, 
orange berries, an orange boomerang-shaped toy, and orange words in a foreign script within a 
speech bubble). On each trial, participants were given regularities for both groups and then 
shown a conforming or non-conforming individual. For example, “Hibbles listen to this kind of 
music (pointing) and Glerks listen to this kind of music (pointing). Look (revealing the target), 
this Hibble is listening to this [conforming or non-conforming] kind of music (pointing).” 
Participants were first asked to provide an evaluation (e.g., “Is it okay or not okay for this Hibble 
to listen to this kind of music”?). Participants who evaluated a behavior as “not okay” were then 
asked to provide a negativity rating; they were presented a scale with three increasingly unhappy 
faces and asked, “Is it a little bad, pretty bad, or very, very bad?” (1 = a little bad, 2 = pretty bad, 
3 = very, very bad). Lastly, participants were asked to provide an explanation of their evaluation 
(e.g., why is it okay/not okay for this Hibble to listen to this kind of music”?). For an example 
trial in Chinese and in the English translation, please see Appendix B. 
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Measures and coding 
 First, we calculated the frequency with which disapproval (“not okay” evaluations) was 
given for both the conformity and non-conformity trials (potential range for each was 0 to 4). We 
focused on the frequency of “not okay” evaluations as the dependent variable, which reflected 
disapproval, because disapproval was our primary interest and because “okay” and “not okay” 
evaluations were precise inverses. Second, we calculated the average negativity ratings of 
participants who evaluated a behavior as “not okay” and were presented with the three-point 
negativity scale (potential range was 1 to 3). Third, participants' explanations were recorded 
verbatim in Chinese, translated into English by the second author, and coded by two research 
assistants who were blind to the hypotheses of the study (Cohen’s kappa = .81). Disagreements 
were resolved by discussion.  
Is in the previous studies, responses were coded into five types: (a) norm-based, (b) 
group-based, (c) individual-based, (d) similarity-based, and (e) other. See Table 1 for a 
description of the coding scheme. Codes were not mutually exclusive, thereby allowing 
participants to appeal to multiple explanations within a single response. We then examined 
within each response type (e.g., approved non-conformity) how often participants provided each 
particular explanation type (relative to the number of trials a particular response type was given). 
For example, a child who approved of non-conformity on 2 trials and gave an individual-based 
explanation on 1 of those trials was coded as having given individual-based explanations for 
approved non-conformity 50% of the time.  
Parent survey. For exploratory purposes, parents and adult participants were also given 
the option of completing a survey (94% response rate) adapted from Feldman (2003) that 
assessed their views on conformity (α = .54), respect for common norms (α = .51), and 
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authoritarianism (α = .35).  Because these measure yielded low reliabilities and were not 
significantly related with participants’ responses, they were not included in the primary analyses. 
However, we did test whether Chinese parents differed from a sample of U.S. parents in their 
value for conformity, respect for norms, and authoritarianism, and found that the Chinese sample 
tended to value group norms significantly more highly, consistent with previous research 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; see Table 11 for these data and analyses). 
Results 
 The data were analyzed as they were Chapter 1, Study 1.  
Disapproval toward conformity and non-conformity 
 There were significant main effects of age group, F(3, 168) = 39.63, p < .001, ηp
2 = .41, 
and behavior, F(1, 168) = 346.13, p < .001, ηp
2 = .67, and a significant interaction of age group 
and behavior, F(3, 168) = 39.20, p < .001, ηp
2 = .41. Consistent with our first hypothesis, all age 
groups were significantly more disapproving of non-conformity than of conformity (ps < .009), 
and consistent with our second hypothesis, disapproval toward non-conformity decreased at each 
age group (ps < .032; though the difference between 4- to 6-year-olds and 7- to 9-year-olds was 
non-significant, p = .059). Please see Tables 11 and 12 for all data and statistics, and Table 13 for 
the non-parametric data. 
Negativity toward non-conformity 
 Focusing only on participants who disapproved of non-conformity and were subsequently 
asked how bad the behavior was (thirty-five 4- to 6-year-olds, thirty 7- to 9-year-olds, twenty-
nine 10- to 13-year-olds, and seventeen adults), we found a main effect of age group, F(3, 107) = 
10.38, p < .001, ηp
2 = .23. Both 4- to 6-year-olds (M = 2.19, SE = .11) and 7- to 9-year-olds (M = 
2.01, SE = .12) were significantly more negative than 10- to 13-year-olds (M = 1.41, SE = .12) 
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and adults (M = 1.49, SE = .16) (ps < .05). The two youngest age groups did not differ 
significantly, nor did the two oldest age groups (ps = 1.00).   
Explanations 
 See Table 14 for the explanation data.  
Explanations about disapproved non-conformity 
 Focusing on participants who disapproved of non-conformity (n = 111), there were 
significant main effects of explanation type, F(2.60, 278.30) = 27.52, p < .001, ηp
2 = .21, and age 
group, F(3, 107) = 8.32, p < .001, ηp
2 = .19, and a significant interaction of explanation and age 
group, F(7.79, 8.89) = 3.56, p = .001, ηp
2 = .09. Four- to -six-year-olds gave mostly similarity-
based and norm-based explanations, 7- to 9-year-olds and 10- to 13-year-olds gave mostly 
similarity-based and group-based explanations, and adults gave mostly group-based 
explanations. Together, these data indicate that when disapproving of non-conformity, younger 
children appealed to normative explanations (consistent with H1), whereas older children 
focused more on group-based explanations.   
Explanations about approved non-conformity 
Few 4- to 6-year-olds (n = 2) and 7- to 9-year-olds (n = 10) approved of non-conformity, 
so these age groups were excluded from this analysis. Thus, focusing on 10- to 13-year-olds (n = 
38) and adults (n = 46) who approved of non-conformity, there were significant main effects of 
explanation type, F(2.42, 198.08) = 42.80, p < .001, ηp
2 = .34, and age group, F(1, 82) = 6.02, p 
= .016, ηp
2 = 07. Overall, both age groups gave mostly individual-based explanations when 
approving of non-conformity, with 10- to 13-year-olds overall giving more of each explanation 
type than adults (with the exception of similarity-based explanations). 
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Explanations about approved conformity  
Focusing on participants who approved of conformity (n = 171), there was a main effect 
of explanation type, F(2.52, 420.32) = 51.38, p < .001, ηp
2 = .24, and age group, F(3, 167) = 
10.21, p < .001, ηp
2 = .16, and a significant interaction of explanation type and age group, F(7.55, 
420.32) = 9.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = .14. Children gave mostly group-based explanations, whereas 
adults gave mostly group-based, individual-based, and similarity-based explanations.   
Secondary data analysis (China vs. U.S.) 
 We next compared the data derived from the present research with those derived from 
Roberts et al. (2017a, Study 1). The data analysis plan paralleled that of the main study, with the 
addition of “country” as a between-subjects variable. We report only the effects involving 
country, as cross-cultural differences were our a priori interest.  
Disapproval toward conformity and non-conformity 
 We found main effects of behavior and age group, a significant interaction of behavior 
and country, F(1, 272) = 6.33, p = .012, ηp
2 = .02, and a significant interaction of age group, 
behavior, and country, F(3, 272) = 6.53, p < .001, ηp
2 = .07. Consistent with our third hypothesis 
(H3), Chinese 4- to 6-year-olds rated non-conformity more disapprovingly than same-aged U.S. 
children (p = .042), and they rated conformity less disapprovingly than same-aged U.S. children 
(p < .001). Rates of disapproval did not differ between countries at any other age group for 
ratings of non-conformity or conformity (ps > .072). The data are depicted graphically in Figure 
10. 
Negativity toward non-conformity 
We next focused only on children (n = 156) who disapproved of non-conformity and 
were subsequently asked how bad the behavior was (only 4 U.S. adults disapproved of non-
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conformity, so we excluded adults from this analysis), and did not find any significant effects 
involving country (ps > .10). Interestingly, this suggests that although Chinese children were 
more disapproving than U.S. children, those who were disapproving were not more negative. 
Explanations about disapproved non-conformity  
Focusing on children who disapproved of non-conformity (n = 156), we found a 
significant effect of country, F(2, 150) = 30.54, p < .001, η = .07, and a significant interaction 
between explanation type and country, F(2.66, 399.65) = 5.33, p = .002, η = .03. Consistent with 
our third prediction, overall, Chinese children provided more norm-based and similarity-based 
explanations than U.S. children (ps < .02).  
Explanations about approved non-conformity. Because younger Chinese children 
rarely approved of non-conformity, we focused only on 10- to 13-year-olds and adults (n = 127), 
though this analysis yielded no significant effects on the basis of country (ps > .072).  
Explanations about approved conformity. Focusing on children who approved of 
conformity (n = 275), we found a significant effect of country, F(1, 267) = 11.85, p = .001, η < 
.04, a significant interaction of age group and country, F(1, 267) = 6.77, p < .001, η = .07, a 
significant interaction of explanation type and country, F(2.75, 733.01) = 11.20, p < .001, η = 
.04, and a significant interaction of explanation type, age group, and country, F(8.23, 733.01) = 
3.35, p = .001, η = .04. All Chinese participant groups gave more similarity-based explanations 
than U.S. participant groups (ps < .042). Chinese 4- to 6-year-olds gave more group-based 
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Discussion 
 The present results indicate that children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency replicates 
cross-culturally. More specifically, consistent with research with same-aged U.S. children 
(Roberts et al., 2017a), and consistent with our first hypothesis, Chinese children disapproved of 
non-conformity, rated it negatively, and provided norm-based explanations when justifying their 
evaluations (e.g., if Hibbles were characterized as listening to a specific kind of music, individual 
Hibbles should listen to that kind of music, and it is bad if they did not). These data are 
consistent with the proposal that a preference for normative conformity is deeply rooted in our 
evolutionary history (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Tomasello, 2016), likely as a result of the central 
role that group-based living played throughout human history (e.g., conforming to group norms 
enhanced the functionality, resources, and survival of the self and the group). Also, again 
replicating previous research, Chinese children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency declined at 
each age group (i.e., regarding non-conformity, the youngest age groups were most likely to 
disapprove, show negativity, and provide norm-based explanations), which aligns with our 
second hypothesis and previous research suggesting that Chinese children (like U.S. children) 
become more sensitive to individual differences with age (Wang, 2004). Of course, additional 
work is needed to examine these questions with a broader range of cultural contexts, but for now, 
they provide empirical evidence that children from two different cultural contexts interpret 
descriptive group regularities as having prescriptive force. 
Critically, though, the strength of this tendency varied cross-culturally (consistent with 
our third hypothesis). Compared to same-aged U.S. children, Chinese 4- to 6-year-olds evaluated 
non-conformity more disapprovingly (and conformity more approvingly), and across all child 
groups, Chinese children provided more norm-based explanations when justifying their 
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disapproval. Additionally, unlike U.S. adults in previous research, Chinese adults in the present 
research were more disapproving of non-conformity than of conformity. This finding was 
especially interesting given that the task was explicit and involved novel groups engaged in 
morally neutral behaviors, suggesting that even under such circumstances, Chinese adults show a 
descriptive-to prescriptive tendency. Taken together, these data are consistent with the reasoning 
that individuals from cultures that more highly value interdependence may be more likely to use 
group regularities to disapprove of non-conformity (because doing so privileges group 
functioning over individual functioning). Thus, the present data provide evidence that although 
the descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency replicates across cultures, the degree of it may not.  
Of course, additional research is needed to understand precisely which cultural factors 
contributed to the cultural variation detected here. As mentioned previously, we reasoned that 
these factors could have included larger historical and societal values (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Oyserman et al., 2012) or parental socialization (Miller et al., 1997; Wang, 2016). Indeed, 
our parental survey, although it was itself unreliable, demonstrated that Chinese parents placed 
greater value on conformity, respect for norms, and authoritarianism than U.S. parents. Thus, 
Chinese children may indeed be taught, explicitly, to place greater value on group norms, which 
may directly influence their descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency. I look forward to future 
research designed to test parent-based pedagogy more systematically.   
One alternative explanation of our findings involves a pedagogical interpretation of the 
task: a knowledgeable experimenter conveyed group regularities and thus children may have 
believed that the experimenter conveyed information for the child’s pedagogical benefit (see 
Butler & Markman, 2012). If so, it would be reasonable for children to disapprove of a non-
conforming individual.  Although possible, we argue that pedagogy does not completely explain 
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children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency, as measured here. First, past work with the same 
methodology shows that when the experimenter describes a single individual engaging in a 
behavior, rather than groups, children are more accepting of non-conformity (see Roberts et al., 
2017a, Study 3; Roberts et al., 2017b, control condition). If children were simply interpreting a 
given behavior as appropriate because they infer that the experimenter is describing it to them for 
pedagogical purposes, then it should not matter whether an individual or a group performed the 
behavior. Second, Chinese children were more prescriptive in their responses than were U.S. 
children, suggesting that larger cultural values, rather than pedagogy per se, influenced 
children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency.   
An important question for future research is to explore precisely why prescriptiveness 
declined with age, which was especially notable given the literature suggesting that there is 
greater value placed on interdependence in China than in the U.S. (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 
1991), and given the alternative prediction that children in more interdependent cultures would 
be increasingly prescriptive with age as a function of their socialization experiences. One 
possibility is that older Chinese children were better than their younger peers at suppressing and 
overriding their responses on this explicit task (see also the discussion in Chapter 5). Indeed, 
U.S. data on racial attitudes suggests that whereas explicit biases decline with age, implicit 
biases often persist (e.g., Apfelbaum, Pauker, Ambady, Sommers, & Norton, 2008; Baron & 
Banaji, 2006). Thus, future research should test whether older children and adults make 
prescriptive judgments at an implicit level. A second possibility is that because the present task 
provided a particularly strong test of attention to conformity (given the novel categories and 
innocuous behaviors), older children and adults may have required additional information or 
more consequential behaviors (e.g., where failure to conform has more overt consequences for 
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the group). Under conditions with more severe acts of non-conformity, older children and adults 
may indeed show a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency, even on an explicit task such as this. A 
third possibility is that older children were more aware of individual differences, thereby making 
them more likely to reason that different people simply like different things (see Quintana, 
1998). The explanation data align with this last interpretation: When 10- to 13-year-olds 
approved of non-conformity, they most often appealed to individual-based explanations (e.g., 
“Everyone has their own thoughts [and] playing with a toy is part of one’s own thoughts. There 
should be no limit on that”). If this was indeed the case, future research should test whether 
encouraging children, especially younger children, to think about individual differences reduces 
their descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency.  
Importantly, I acknowledge that there exists much variation within cultures. Certainly, a 
variety of factors are likely to influence a child's attention to group norms, whether in the U.S. or 
China (e.g., rural vs. urban, liberal vs. conservative, part of a majority or minority) and thus their 
acceptance of non-conformity (for data on variation in social group concepts, see Rhodes & 
Gelman, 2009 for context-based variation, and Roberts & Gelman, 2016 for group membership-
based variation). We look forward to future research that explores within-culture variation more 
systematically, as doing so would provide a richer and more nuanced understanding of the 
effects detected here. (See also Talhelm et al., 2014 for a description of differences in 
interdependence within China as a function of rice vs. wheat farming.  Notably, the Hubei 
Province studied here is one of the provinces that Talhelm et al. (2014) identified as relatively 
interdependent.) For now, however, the present research documents that children’s descriptive-
to-prescriptive tendency both replicates and varies cross-culturally.  
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Lastly, an important issue is the extent to which the present findings with novel groups to 
which children did not belong would extend to real-life settings. Certainly, children have learned 
to associate stereotypical features with a variety of social groups. For example, English children 
report that English soccer fans are friendly (Abrams et al., 2009), U.S. children report that boys 
play with toy trucks (Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009), Israeli children report that Arabic 
people wear scarves (Barrett, 1996), and South African children report that white people are 
wealthy (Olson, Shutts, Kinzler, & Weisman, 2012). Children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive 
tendency, augmented by years of real-world experiences (e.g., socialization, group membership, 
moral concerns), may lead to the inference that English soccer fans should be friendly, boys 
should play with toy trucks, Arabic people should wear scarves, and white people should be 
wealthy. Thus, the early emergence and pervasiveness of stereotype development may be firmly 
rooted in children’s reasoning about social group norms, and data presented in Chapter four 
suggest that this reasoning replicates (and varies) cross-culturally.   
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Table 11 
Parent Survey (Chapter IV). Mean frequencies and standard errors from the parent survey (adult 
self-report data). U.S. data come from Roberts et al. (2017b; Chapter III). 












Respect for Norms 
 
Authoritarian 
      
China 4-6 39 4.05(.10) 3.56(.11) 2.18(.18) 
 7-9 34 4.07(.10) 3.24(.12) 2.24(.19) 
 10-13 42 3.93(.07) 3.08(.08) 2.12(.14) 
 Adult 50 3.52(.10) 2.74(.11) 1.30(.19) 
      
U.S.  4-6 107 3.04(.06) 2.66(.07) 1.08(.11) 
 7-9 78 2.94(.07) 2.76(.08) 1.33(.13) 
 10-13 62 3.58(.08) 3.08(.10) 1.57(.14) 
 Adult n/a n/a n/a n/a 
      
Note. Scores could range from 0 to 6. Although the parent survey was unreliable and 
uncorrelated with children’s responses, we tested whether Chinese parents differed from U.S. 
parents in their value for conformity, respect for norms, and authoritarianism. Data from the U.S. 
participants were from Roberts et al. (2017b), which included participants from the same source 
as those recruited in Roberts et al. (2017a). We did not include data from the adult participants 
because of insufficient data from U.S. adults. A 2 (country: China, U.S.) by 2 (age group: 4-6, 7-
9) multivariate ANOVA with country and age group as between-subjects variables, and value for 
conformity, respect for common norms, and authoritarianism as the dependent variables, yielded 
main effects of country on all three outcomes: Conformity, F(1, 356) = 135.82, p < .001, η = .28, 
respect for norms, F(1, 356) = 31.00, p < .001, η = .08, and authoritarianism, F(1, 356) = 47.47, 
p < .001, η = .12. On each, Chinese parents gave higher ratings than U.S. parents. There was also 
an interaction between country and age group on conformity, F(2, 362) = 11.69, p < .001, η = 
.06, and on respect for norms, F(2, 362) = 6.20, p = .002, η = .03. Pairwise comparisons showed 
that on each outcome, Chinese parents gave higher scores than did U.S parents (all ps < .02; 
though there were no country-based differences with regard to respect for norms for 10- to 13-
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Table 12.  
Disapproval data (Chapter IV). Means, standard errors, and one-sample t-test statistics 
comparing average disapproval frequencies against chance (i.e., 2) across age groups and 



























 Conformity .17(.09) -19.62 < .001 3.27 
      
7-9 Non-conformity 3.03(.27) 3.85 < .001 .63 
 Conformity .14(.09) 21.18 < .001 3.45 
      
10-13 Non-conformity 1.50(.23) -2.17 .035 .33 
 Conformity .13(.05) -38.87 < .001 5.61 
      
Adults Non-conformity .73(.18) -7.10 < .001 .99 
 Conformity .18(.10) -18.27 < .001 2.56 
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Table 13. 
Non-parametric data (Chapter IV). Non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests across age 
groups and behaviors, indicating how many Chinese children most often approved (okay), most 




































 Conformity 32 4 0 5.01 <.001 .84 
        
7-9 Non-conformity 7 30 0 3.31 < .001 .55 
 Conformity 34 3 0 5.21 < .001 .86 
        
10-13 Non-conformity 29 19 0 1.96 .005 .28 
 Conformity 42 6 0 6.36 <.001 .92 
        
Adults Non-conformity 34 17 0 1.99 .047 .29 
 Conformity 47 4 0 5.82 < .001 .82 
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Table 14.  
Explanation data (Chapter IV). Percentage of explanation types for each behavior, across 
evaluation types and age groups. 
     




































  7-9 30 23.6(5.9) 52.5(8.0) 5.8(3.9) 44.2(7.8) 
  10-13 29 20.4(6.0) 59.2(8.2) 14.1(4.0) 44.3(7.9) 

























  7-9 10 2.5(5.5) 28.3(9.5) 70.8(10.9) 13.3(4.7) 
  10-13 38 11.6(2.8) 23.7(4.9) 54.4(5.6) 3.3(2.4) 

























  7-9 37 6.1(2.2) 57.2(6.2) 12.2(4.6) 40.8(6.2) 
  10-13 48 8.2(1.9) 42.9(5.5) 28.3(4.0) 27.8(5.4) 
  Adult 50 5.5(1.9) 23.0(5.4) 26.0(4.0) 20.5(5.3) 
        
Note. Scores represent each type of explanation out of the total number of trials. Across studies, 
individual explanations could have been coded as of more than one type, and explanations that 
did not fit any of the codes are not reported (thus explaining why the percentages add to more 
than or less than 100). Because participants rarely disapproved of conformity, data for this 
response type are not presented.  
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Figure 10. Disapproval data (Chapter IV). Mean frequency of disapproval of conformity and 
non-conformity across age groups and country. Scores could range from 0 to 4. Bars depict 
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 In the studies presented in this dissertation, I examined children’s and adults’ use of 
descriptive group regularities to make prescriptive judgments. In Chapter 2, I found that children 
interpreted the regularities as prescriptive, even when the groups were novel and third-party, and 
the behaviors were innocuous. I also found that this descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency was 
robust across intergroup contexts (i.e., regardless of whether a group is in competition or 
cooperation with another, individual group members should conform to group norms), and that 
an emphasis on individuality reduced children’s prescriptiveness. In Chapter 3, I tested how 
visual and linguistic cues contributed to this tendency, and found that prescriptive judgments 
were elicited when the group regularities were conveyed through group presence, category 
labels, or generic statements (and not in the absence of these factors). In Chapter 4, I examined 
whether children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency replicated internationally, and found that 
the tendency to use group regularities to make prescriptive judgments emerged in early 
childhood in two distinct cultures, though cultural values nonetheless influenced the degree to 
which it predominates across these two populations. Although these findings do not generalize 
beyond these two populations, they provide preliminary evidence for a cross-cultural descriptive-
to-prescriptive tendency.   
Overall, these data have important implications for furthering the understanding of 
children’s social reasoning, and they provide empirical support for an early emerging 
descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency that persists even in the absence of additional factors 
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previously shown to foster prescriptive judgments. That is, unlike previous research in 
developmental, social, and cognitive psychology in which children’s prescriptive judgments 
were found to be fostered by socialization and familiarity with the groups (Bigler & Liben, 
2006), in-group membership (Rutland et al., 2015; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), beliefs about what is 
morally appropriate (Cooley & Kileen, 2015; Smetana et al., 2012), or beliefs about between-
group cooperation and allegiances (McAuliffe & Dunham, 2016; Rhodes, 2013; Sherif & Sherif, 
1953), children in the present research prescriptively evaluated non-conformity even with respect 
to harmless behaviors of novel, third-party groups, and irrespective of whether those groups were 
in competition or cooperation with one another. Again, children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive 
tendency was elicited by minimal input (Chapter 3), and it replicated across international 
contexts (Chapter 4). Together, these findings provide strong support for the notion that group 
norms play a foundational role in social cognition (Tomasello, 2016).  
Prescriptive judgments of non-conformity may also link to important educational and 
psychosocial outcomes. For instance, Black students who are accused of “acting White” (by 
virtue of their speech, clothing, racial identity of friends, music preferences, or academic 
achievement) at times disengage academically in order to avoid negative judgment, feel a 
decreased sense of racial identity, and show increased anxiety, depression, and emotional stress 
(Durkee & Williams, 2013). The present findings suggest that these judgments may be 
foundational in childhood, and thus potentially pervasive and difficult to modify. More 
generally, social groups paired with morally neutral content (e.g., “Chinese food”, “Black 
music”, “Girl toys”) may foster a belief in descriptive regularities (e.g., Chinese people eat 
Chinese food). In turn, these regularities could license prescriptive judgments (e.g., Chinese 
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people should eat Chinese food). In other words, for young children, seemingly innocuous input 
could generate beliefs about appropriate behavior across a wide array of content. 
Limitations and future directions 
An important avenue for future research is to explore the mechanisms responsible for 
why prescriptive judgments declined with age. One possibility is that younger children have an 
undifferentiated concept of normality in which they conceptualize descriptiveness and 
prescriptiveness as one and the same, whereas with age, children develop the ability to 
differentiate between the two (Bear & Knobe, 2016). This would suggest that the descriptive-to-
prescriptive link is an early emerging bias that fades as people learn that regularities per se are 
insufficient to prompt normative judgments. A second possibility is that older children and adults 
need a more complex array of factors that were intentionally removed from the present study 
(i.e., experiences with given groups, perceptions of social threat, more severe moral violations) 
to determine which features are relevant to evaluative judgments. That is, participants in all age 
groups may have engaged in such reasoning, but the cues eliciting such reasoning may change 
with age. Certainly, sociopolitical contexts and beliefs shape social perception (e.g., Dunham, 
2011; Ho et al., 2015), and judgments regarding non-conformity may likewise reflect such 
factors. A third possibility is that older children and adults hold the same descriptive-to-
prescriptive intuitions as younger children, but that they suppress or override them on this 
explicit task. Consistent with this possibility, research on a range of stereotypes and biased 
attitudes (regarding race, gender, etc.) shows that whereas explicit and self-reported biases 
decline with age, subtle and less conscious biases persist at an implicit level (e.g., Apfelbaum et 
al., 2008; Baron & Banaji, 2006; Dunham et al., 2008; Eidsen & Coley, 2014). Future research 
with implicit response tasks could test whether older children and adults exhibit a subtler yet 
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persistent descriptive-to-prescriptive link. For example, older children and adults placed under 
time demands may show more intuitive, reflexive, and rapid judgments, making prescriptive 
judgments at a rate comparable to younger children.  
Future research should include individual difference measures (e.g., psychological 
essentialism) to gain further insights, as children predisposed to attend more to group-based 
information may be more sensitive to group norms. Similarly, future research would also do well 
to directly manipulate how the groups are portrayed. Here, we gave no background information 
about the groups, therefore leaving open children’s perceptions. Children who perceived the 
groups as intimately related may have relied on notions of group loyalty, whereas those who 
conceptualized the groups as task focused may have relied on notions of interdependence (see 
Lickel et al., 2000; Plötner, Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2016). Another future direction will 
be to examine the extent to which children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency influences their 
real-world behavior. In the present studies, I assessed children’s beliefs and evaluations of what 
is ideal and acceptable (i.e., prescriptive judgments; Bear & Knobe, 2016 and not their active 
efforts to maintain and perpetuate norms (i.e., norm enforcement; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). 
Do children also disapprove of non-conformity, explicitly or implicitly, when they encounter it 
in the real-world? Previous research suggests that they would. As mentioned previously, when 
children observe a tool being used in a certain way, they protest against individuals who use the 
tool differently (e.g., “You must do this”; Kenward, 2012). Similarly, when children learn the 
rules of a game and observe someone violate those rules, they respond with explicit protest and 
critique (e.g., "You can't do that"; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). Moreover, children spontaneously 
create their own norms, teach them to others, and negatively evaluate those who do not conform 
(Göckeritz et al., 2014). Thus, it is possible that when children learn a group norm, even one that 
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is novel, third-party, and harmless, they sponateously critique those who fail to conform. 
Observational studies in which children are shown group norms and subsequently encounter a 
non-conforming individual would do well to determine the extent to which this tendency extends 
beyond more tightly controlled lab settings, and would speak more directly to real-world norm 
enforcement. 
These dissertation data are also limited in that they speak only to group norms that 
involve behaviors (i.e., language spoken, music listened to, games played, food eaten). An open 
question is whether children also adhere to group norms that involve beliefs. That is, if a group is 
characterized by a particular belief, do children infer that individual group members should also 
hold that belief? Work conducted by Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, and Banaji (2013) provided some 
preliminary insights. More specifically, they found that children were most likely to 
conceptualize a belief as objective (i.e., that the belief was a “right” or “correct” proposition) 
when that belief was factual (e.g., the sky is blue), followed by when that belief was ideological 
(e.g., that there is one God), followed by preference-based beliefs (e.g., that roses are beautiful). 
When reasoning about factual beliefs, children may maintain that it is appropriate to conform to 
what is objectively correct, irrespective of what the group believes (e.g., if the group believes 
that a blue sky is red, individual group members should not conform). When reasoning about 
preference-based beliefs, children may maintain that it is appropriate to hold any belief, 
irrespective of what the group believes (e.g., if the group thinks roses are beautiful, it is up to 
individual group members to conform or not). When reasoning about ideological beliefs, which 
again, are conceptualized as entailing an element of fact and preference (Heiphetz et al., 2013), it 
is unclear whether children believe that individual group members should conform to the 
ideological beliefs of the group (e.g., if the group believes in a specific deity, should individual 
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group members conform?). Systematically testing these questions would further the 
understanding of the domains in which children interpret group norms as prescriptive. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present studies provide a foundation for exploring the contexts that 
foster or inhibit children’s tendency to treat group regularities as having prescriptive force, and 
many additional questions are yet to be explored. For example, are these effects specific to the 
human domain, or do they hold even when reasoning about non-human animals (for research on 
domain-based category judgments, see Keil, 1989; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009)? Do children also 
negatively evaluate non-conforming individuals whose group norms are themselves negative 
(e.g., a person who decides to help, although hurting is more typical of their group; see Cooley & 
Killen, 2015; Rhodes, 2012; Smetana et al., 2012)? These important questions await future 
research, and promise to further reveal children’s social-cognitive capacities. 
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Appendix A – Item Effects 
In Chapter 2, additional analyses were conducted to ensure that the results did not vary by 
the specific item (i.e., berry, language, games, music). These data are presented below.  
Study 1 
Disapproval toward conformity and non-conformity. We conducted a 4 (age group: 4-
6, 7-9, 10-13, adult) x 2 (behavior type: conformity, non-conformity) x 4 (domain: food, games, 
language, music) repeated measured ANOVA with age group as a between-subjects variable, 
behavior and domain as within-subjects variables, and the frequency of not-okay evaluations as 
the dependent variable. There was no main effect of domain, F(3, 306) = .89, p = .45, ηp
2 = .009, 
two way interaction of domain and age group, F(9, 306) = .95, p = .49, ηp
2 = .03, two way 
interaction effect of domain and behavior, F(3, 306) = .41, p = .75, ηp
2 = .004, or three way 
interaction of domain, age group, and behavior, F(3, 306) = .87, p = ..55, ηp
2 = .03. These 
analyses were supported by a series of one-sample t-tests comparing disapproval rates to chance 
(i.e., 5) for each item (i.e., food, games, language, music). Consistent with the general patterns, 
for conformity, all participant groups were below chance on every item: 4 to 6 (ps < .05). For 
non-conformity, 4- to 6-year-olds were above chance on all items (ps < .04), 7- to 9-year-olds 
and 10- to 13-year-olds were at chance on all items (ps > .21), and adults were below chance on 
all items (ps < .001).
Negativity toward non-conformity. Next, we focused only on children who disapproved 
of non-conformity and were asked how bad the non-conforming behavior was (1 = kind of bad, 2 
= pretty bad, 3 = very, very bad; n = 64). Again, we focused on children because only 1 adult 
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disapproved of non-conformity. Because not all children disapproved of all items (e.g., a child 
could have disapproved of non-conformity for music but not for language), we could not make a 
direct comparison across items. Therefore, we conducted four univariate ANOVAs with age 
group as the independent variable and negativity toward a specific item (i.e., berries, games, 
language, music) as the dependent variable. Overall, each analysis showed that within each 
domain, negativity was higher in the youngest age group compared to the oldest age group. 
Regarding berries, there was a marginally significant effect of age group, F(2, 49) = 2.71, p = 
.077, ηp
2 = .10, showing that 4- to 6-year-olds (M = 2.42, SE = .20) were marginally more 
negative than 10- to 13-year-olds (M = 1.75, SE = .21) (p = .07). For games, there was again a 
significant effect of age group, F(2, 46) = 4.16, p = .022, ηp
2 = .15, showing that 4- to 6-year-olds 
(M = 2.42, SE = .19) were more negative than 10- to 13-year-olds (M = 1.62, SE = .23) (p = .03). 
For language, there was a significant effect of age group, F(2. 48) = 3.67, p = .03, ηp
2 = .13, 
showing that 4- to 6-year-olds (M = 2.53, SE = .19) were more negative than 10- to 13-year-olds 
(M = 1.80, SE = .20) (p = .028). For music, there was a significant effect of age group, F(2, 46) = 
4.84, p = .012, ηp
2 = .17, showing that 4- to 6-year-olds (M = 2.44, SE = .19) were more negative 
than 10- to 13-year-olds (M = 1.54, SE = .22) (p = .01).  
Study 2 
 Disapproval toward conformity and non-conformity. We conducted a 4 (age group: 4-
6, 7-9, 10-13, adult) x 2 (behavior: conformity, non-conformity) x 4 (domain: food, games, 
language, music) x 2 (condition: competition, cooperation) repeated measured ANOVA, with 
age group and condition as between-subjects variables, behavior and domain as within-subjects 
variables, and the frequency of not-okay evaluations as the dependent variable. There was no 
main effect of domain, F(3, 558) = .85, p = .47, ηp
2 = .005, two way interaction of domain and 
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age group, F(9, 558) = 1.52, p = .14, ηp
2 = .02, two way interaction of domain and behavior, F(3, 
558) = 1.49, p = .22, ηp
2 = .008, two way interaction of domain and condition, F(3, 558) = .16, p 
= .92, ηp
2 = .001, domain, age group, and condition, F(9, 558) = 1.69, p = .09, ηp
2 = .03, three 
way interaction of domain, age group, and behavior, F(9, 558) = 2.71, p = .077, ηp
2 = .10, three 
way interaction of domain, behavior, and condition, F(3, 5587) = .03, p = .99, ηp
2 < .001, or a 
four way interaction of domain, behavior, age group, and condition, F(9, 558) = .82, p = .60, ηp
2 
= .013. Also, consistent with the pattern presented in the main text, for conformity, all age 
groups were below chance on all items (ps < .001). For non-conformity, across all items, 4- to 6-
year-olds and 7- to 9-year-olds were above chance (ps < .003), 10- to 13-year-olds were at 
chance (ps > .56), and adults were below chance (ps < .001).  
 Negativity toward non-conformity. Next, we again focused only on children (not adults 
because of insufficient data) who disapproved of non-conformity and were asked how bad the 
non-conforming behavior was. We again conducted four univariate ANOVAs with age group as 
the independent variable and negativity toward a specific item (i.e., berries, games, language, 
music) as the dependent variable. There were no significant age group effects regarding berries, 
F(2, 94) = .76, p = .47, ηp
2 = .016, language,  F(2, 94) = .68, p = .51, ηp
2 = .014, or music, F(2, 
91) = .32, p = .73, ηp
2 = .007. Notably, there was a significant age group effect regarding games, 
F(2, 90) = .3.57, p = .03, ηp
2 = .074. Pairwise comparisons showed that 4- to 6-year-olds (M = 
2.26, SE = .14) were marginally more negative than 10- to 13-year-olds (M = 1.71, SE = .18) (p = 
.053).    
Study 3 
Disapproval toward conformity and non-conformity. One-sample t-tests to compared 
disapproval rates against chance (i.e., .5) for each domain, showing that for conformity, 
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disapproval was below chance across all domains (though marginally for berries): Berries: M = 
.32, SE = .10, t(25) = -1.89, p = .07; Games: M = .20, SE = .08, t(25) = -3.67, p = .001; 
Language: M = .16, SE = .08, t(25) = -4.54, p < .001; Music: M = .20, SE = .08, t(25) = -3.67, p = 
.001. For non-conformity, disapproval was at chance across all domains: Berries: M = .36, SE = 
.10, t(25) = -1.43, p = .17; Games: M = .36, SE = .10, t(25) = -1.43, p = .16; Language: M = .40, 
SE = .10, t(25) = -1.00, p = .33; Music: M = .36, SE = .10, t(25) = -1.43, p = .16. A series of 
independent samples t-test showed that for each domain, disapproval rates between conformity 
and non-conformity did not differ significantly from one another (though there was a marginal 
difference for berries, p = .06). 
Negativity toward non-conformity. For all items, children’s negativity toward non-
conformity were in the “a little bad” range: Berries (M = 2.33, SE = .27), Games (M = 2.11, SE = 
.29), Language (M = 1.90, SE = .26), Music (M = 2.11, SE = .29). A series of paired-sample t-
tests showed that these values did not differ significantly from one another (p > .50).   
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Appendix B – Chinese and English Scripts 











“I’m going to tell you about two kinds of groups. This group (pointing) is called Hibbles, and 
this group (pointing) is called Glerks.” 
“Hibbles (pointing) eat these kind of berries and Glerks (pointing) eat these kinds of berries. 
Look, this Glerk (pointing to target) is eating these kind of berries.” 
Evaluation: “Is it okay or not okay for this Glerk to eat these kind of berries?”  
Negativity: [if participant evaluated this as not okay] “Is it a little bad, pretty bad, or very, very 
bad, for this Hibble to eat these kind of berries?” 
Explanation: “Why is it [okay or not okay] for this Glerk to eat these kind of berries?”  
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